Skip to main content

Posts

Showing posts from November, 2015

The error of using historical arguments to support philosophical claims and vice versa

In my last post, I failed to clarify an important point. Coyne, in his argument, seems to be accusing theists of arguing that because science originated within a theistic context, theistic belief is necessary for science. Coyne then attempts to make a historical refutation of this claim. So far as I know, no historian has ever made the claim that theistic belief is necessary to do science. The historical point (or points) that they make, rather, is that (1) a full-blown scientific movement only originated once in history, within a theistic (specifically Christian) culture and, (2) that the religious beliefs of late medieval and early modern scientists inspired them in their exploration of science. Some historians would go further and argue that, (3) considering the fact that the proto-scientific practices that existed in the ancient Greek and medieval Islamic worlds foundered and never produced a truly scientific movement, in the sense we understand it today, therefore there was some...

Science, Lies and...Other Stuff

Today, it is widely accepted among historians of science that religious belief (in particular, Christianity) has had a positive influence on the rise and development of modern science, since the late medieval period. This thesis is sometimes called the ‘Whitehead thesis’, because Alfred North Whitehead was one of the earliest prominent proponents of this view. This thesis is neatly summarised by science historian Gary Ferngren: While some historians had always regarded the Draper-White thesis [see below] as oversimplifying and distorting a complex relationship, in the late twentieth century it underwent a more systematic reevaluation. The result is the growing recognition among historians of science that the relationship of religion and science has been much more positive than is sometimes thought. Although popular images of controversy continue to exemplify the supposed hostility of Christianity to new scientific theories, studies have shown that Christianity has often nur...

The Rhetoric of Reason vs. the Practice of Rational Dialogue

One trend that I have been continually struck by in my study of 'pop atheism' is what I have come to term the 'rhetoric of reason'. (I didn't coin the term, but I have co-opted it as it suits what I am talking about perfectly.) What I mean by the 'rhetoric of reason' is a rhetorical appeal to the authority of reason, as opposed to the practice of reasoning. Many people, and in particular many atheists in the 'pop atheist' or 'new atheist' tradition, appeal to Reason. Relatively few people have read widely enough in the philosophy of religion to engage seriously with the best arguments for and against the existence of God. Reason is not about making appeals to logic and science, pointing out the evils done in the name of God or Jesus or Mohamed or...whatever; and then knocking down a few straw-man arguments, just to show that you can. This, nevertheless, is essentially the approach taken by neo-atheist writers. The writings of Sam Harris and ...

The revival of the philosophy of religion in the twentieth century: A (selective) history

I have noted in a previous post that natural theology , and in particular the classic arguments for the existence of God , declined within mainstream philosophy during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. I also stated that the cause of this decline was the rise of a philosophy known as logical positivism/empiricism, advocated by an influential group of scholars known as the Vienna Circle. Logical positivists dismissed metaphysical statements – particularly statements about God – as ‘meaningless’, because they could not be verified empirically. Such severe restrictions on what could be considered ‘meaningful’ statements meant that, for over half a century, rational discussion of the existence of God ground to a halt within mainstream philosophy. This opposition to theistic arguments was, actually, a continuation of a trend in mainstream philosophy that had begun with the publication of Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason in 1781. Kant delivered what many consid...