Firstly, a comment about my blog title. There will be a lot of 'musings' on a lot of topics, I expect, though, hopefully, I'll be able to keep the 'meandering' down to a minimum. Nevertheless, 'meandering' is probably the best way to describe how my mind works. I like to pick a topic and then just think, making connections between ideas that may seem completely unrelated and then drawing out the implications of these connections. Some people talk about 'deep thinkers'. Well, my approach to reasoning (while I like to keep it 'deep') is more about a networking of ideas in my head. As regards the depth of my thoughts, I'll rely heavily on those who have thought deeply before me - though putting my own 'spin' on it.
This is the first time I've seriously attempted to set out my ideas on subjects that I tend to think a lot about - outside of Uni essays, where the topics for discussion are often predetermined. There will be no predetermined topics here. I'll write whatever.
The substance of Dawkins' critique of 'the discontinuous mind' is based on Darwinism - or, more accurately, neo-Darwinism. The logic of the argument is simple. Humans are a species of ape, having evolved from ape-like creatures, just like chimps, gorillas, etc. The physiological (and genetic) distinction between humans and chimps, etc. is not that great. Moreover, this distinction came about as the result of thousands (probably tens of thousands) of tiny steps, via genetic mutation + differential reproduction (natural selection) in response to environmental conditions and other factors. In each step the children were not noticeably distinct from their parents. As a result, there is no way to draw hard-and-fast or 'absolute' moral distinctions between the value of humans and their closest relatives in the animal kingdom.
Firstly, for the sake of argument, I'll not challenge the validity of the neo-Darwinian account of the history of life here. Those interested in such an approach would be best served by reading the works of Stephen C. Meyer, most significantly his Signature in the Cell and Darwin's Doubt. Instead, I'm going to focus on the philosophical - specifically the moral - implications of Dawkins' logic here.
Dawkins advocates developing a 'continuous mind', instead of a 'discontinuous mind'. He acknowledges that this is difficult to do and that the 'discontinuous mind' is 'ubiquitous'. One wonders whether Dawkins has ever seriously considered that there may be rational reasons for why that is. He blames it on 'lawyers' and 'the religious', as though that explains it, somehow. It doesn't.
In reality, Dawkins is arguing against the traditional morality of Western society - and not just Western society. Dawkins' attitude here is an excellent example of what the Medieval literature scholar C.S. Lewis called 'chronological snobbery'. (Hey, if Dawkins can hand out labels, why can't Lewis?) This is the assumption that because certain ideas from the past have been crowded out by recent ideas, the recent ideas are, almost automatically, superior to the older ideas. For example, consider how people tend to assume that because certain ideas are 'old fashioned' they must be wrong.
Of course, one could argue that appealing to 'the traditional morality of Western society' is an example of 'Western snobbery'. But, as Lewis himself argues, morality (and the ability to reason morally) is something that is innate within human beings, even though no society can claim to have applied its best moral principles consistently and all societies have, at times, tolerated and even institutionalized deeply immoral and anti-human ideas and behaviours. Certain moral values are (almost) universal among societies, including valuing human life. What is interesting is that, when societies institutionalize anti-human behaviours, e.g. slavery or the caste system in India, they always feel the need to rationalize such behaviours. The need to rationalize such behaviours, I think, indicates that such societies recongise the immorality of their actions, but choose to ignore it, often by appeals to the 'greater good' or the 'inferiority' or those being suppressed. Again, the need to use such language indicates that people have a innate understanding of the immorality of such actions, while at the same time choosing to ignore it. If the knowledge that anti-human behaviour is immoral were not innate among humans, one would not encounter all over the world, the need to rationalize anti-human behaviour. Animals do not feel the need to rationalize killing their own kind or other species. We are the only species that considers the moral implications of our actions toward our own and toward other species.
Dawkins makes a two assumptions in making this argument, in particular:
1. That the world in which we live is intrinsically non-teleological (i.e., without 'ends' or 'goals').
2. That applying a 'continuous' understanding to ethics is a superior approach to practical ethics than using a 'discontinuous' understanding, particularly regarding the treatment of animals.
The question of teleology in nature is highly complex, so I won't deal with it now. Suffice it to say that the rise of the 'mechanistic' view of nature that developed in the early modern period (and has come to dominate our view of the cosmos), essentially eliminated, in the minds of many, any room for teleology in nature. Philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel critiques this mechanistic view of reality brilliantly in his book Mind and Cosmos. See here, here, here, and here for excerpts from this work.
I want to focus on the implications of Dawkins' argument for moral philosophy. The basic problem with Dawkins' 'continuous' mentality is that, instead of elevating the moral status of the great apes, it actually eliminates our ability to make meaningful moral distinctions at all. And making meaningful distinctions is essential to any form of reasoning.
If you argue that, because humans and chimps both evolved via an incremental, continuous process from the same ancestors, you cannot therefore make morally significant distinctions between them, then using this logic, you must also conclude that you cannot make meaningful moral distinctions between the value of chimps and and that of shrews (for example), between shrews and other mammals, between mammals and birds, between birds and reptiles, between reptiles and fish, between fish and plankton, between plankton and single-celled organisms and, (possibly) between single-celled organisms and pre-biotic chemical compounds.
Why not? Because, according to neo-Darwinism, each of these creatures evolved from common ancestors via an incremental, continuous biological process. It starts out as a few steps, then a few dozen, then a few hundred...thousand...million, etc. Each step in this process was just as small and (morally) insignificant as the step before it, and the step before that. Ultimately, you cannot make morally meaningful distinctions between any closely-related species. But all species are closely-related some some other species, which are closely-related to some other species, and so on. Any moral distinction you attempt to draw between a doctor providing anti-biotics to patients in order to kill (potentially) hundreds of thousands of bacteria infecting their body and, say. the Holocaust or the Cambodia killing fields is meaningless, if one accepts Dawkins' 'continuous mind' as the right way of thinking about the relative value of humans to other creatures.
There is, of course, a solution to this dilemma: Reject Dawkins premise. Acknowledge that there is something (indeed, many things) about human beings that make them morally unique - most significantly, the fact that human beings are capable of thinking of the value of life in moral terms, in stark contrast to other creatures. Other creatures may, indeed, be able to recognise 'appropriate behaviour' in a particular context and behave accordingly. And animals may consciously behave in altruistic ways, that we interpret as 'moral' behaviour. But animals themselves do not, and cannot, think of these actions as 'moral' in anything like the same sense that humans do. They simply lack the potential for moral reasoning that human beings innately have.
Surely, the fact that humans beings are the only species with the ability to think of behaviour and value in moral terms implies (no: necessitates) that humans have moral value that other creatures do not. Of course, once you recognise this, you must also recognise that humans, as the only morally-aware creatures on this planet, have a unique obligation to recognise the innate value of other creatures, both personally and legally.
Dawkins' 'continuous mind' undermines any meaningful discussion of our moral obligations toward other creatures. A 'discontinuous mind' is one of the pillars for sound reasoning about how we should treat other creatures, NOT its enemy.
In a sense, Dawkins' own argument (unwittingly) accepts my point. Dawkins clearly regards moral reasoning as highly significant. He is, after all, reasoning morally when he makes his argument (or trying to). Also, he is clearly addressing his arguments to humans, because we are the only creatures who are capable of understanding his argument and appreciating its significance (or insignificance). Thus, Dawkins' argument implicitly accepts the fundamental importance of being able to reason morally to arguments about the moral significance of animals. That is, he clearly views human beings' ability to reason morally as significant, even though his ideology apparently prevents him from acknowledging the unique moral significance of humans in the world.
This is the first time I've seriously attempted to set out my ideas on subjects that I tend to think a lot about - outside of Uni essays, where the topics for discussion are often predetermined. There will be no predetermined topics here. I'll write whatever.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
----------------------------------------------------------------------
A Critique of Richard Dawkins' Attempted Argument for Animal Rights, based on developing a 'continuous mind'
The first thing I'd like to write about is an argument I encountered while reading Richard Dawkins' essay 'Gaps in the Mind'. (I read the version of the essay published in his book A Devil's Chaplain. Other versions on the internet my differ slightly, i.e., be more abbreviated.) In this essay Dawkins argues against what he calls 'the discontinuous mind'. This is a way of thinking that tends to draw sharp distinctions between 'humans' and 'animals', particularly regarding their moral significance. Human lives are regarded as being of primary, one could say 'absolute', value; whereas, the value of animals lives, while still significant, is much less than that of humans. In a very real sense, this is one of the basic ideas behind traditional forms of morality. By contrast, Dawkins appears to base his own views heavily on the 'animal liberationist' philosophy of Peter Singer, which is based heavily on the view that humans should not be viewed as being morally distinct from animals, because all creatures have evolved from a common ancestor.The substance of Dawkins' critique of 'the discontinuous mind' is based on Darwinism - or, more accurately, neo-Darwinism. The logic of the argument is simple. Humans are a species of ape, having evolved from ape-like creatures, just like chimps, gorillas, etc. The physiological (and genetic) distinction between humans and chimps, etc. is not that great. Moreover, this distinction came about as the result of thousands (probably tens of thousands) of tiny steps, via genetic mutation + differential reproduction (natural selection) in response to environmental conditions and other factors. In each step the children were not noticeably distinct from their parents. As a result, there is no way to draw hard-and-fast or 'absolute' moral distinctions between the value of humans and their closest relatives in the animal kingdom.
Firstly, for the sake of argument, I'll not challenge the validity of the neo-Darwinian account of the history of life here. Those interested in such an approach would be best served by reading the works of Stephen C. Meyer, most significantly his Signature in the Cell and Darwin's Doubt. Instead, I'm going to focus on the philosophical - specifically the moral - implications of Dawkins' logic here.
Dawkins advocates developing a 'continuous mind', instead of a 'discontinuous mind'. He acknowledges that this is difficult to do and that the 'discontinuous mind' is 'ubiquitous'. One wonders whether Dawkins has ever seriously considered that there may be rational reasons for why that is. He blames it on 'lawyers' and 'the religious', as though that explains it, somehow. It doesn't.
In reality, Dawkins is arguing against the traditional morality of Western society - and not just Western society. Dawkins' attitude here is an excellent example of what the Medieval literature scholar C.S. Lewis called 'chronological snobbery'. (Hey, if Dawkins can hand out labels, why can't Lewis?) This is the assumption that because certain ideas from the past have been crowded out by recent ideas, the recent ideas are, almost automatically, superior to the older ideas. For example, consider how people tend to assume that because certain ideas are 'old fashioned' they must be wrong.
Of course, one could argue that appealing to 'the traditional morality of Western society' is an example of 'Western snobbery'. But, as Lewis himself argues, morality (and the ability to reason morally) is something that is innate within human beings, even though no society can claim to have applied its best moral principles consistently and all societies have, at times, tolerated and even institutionalized deeply immoral and anti-human ideas and behaviours. Certain moral values are (almost) universal among societies, including valuing human life. What is interesting is that, when societies institutionalize anti-human behaviours, e.g. slavery or the caste system in India, they always feel the need to rationalize such behaviours. The need to rationalize such behaviours, I think, indicates that such societies recongise the immorality of their actions, but choose to ignore it, often by appeals to the 'greater good' or the 'inferiority' or those being suppressed. Again, the need to use such language indicates that people have a innate understanding of the immorality of such actions, while at the same time choosing to ignore it. If the knowledge that anti-human behaviour is immoral were not innate among humans, one would not encounter all over the world, the need to rationalize anti-human behaviour. Animals do not feel the need to rationalize killing their own kind or other species. We are the only species that considers the moral implications of our actions toward our own and toward other species.
Dawkins makes a two assumptions in making this argument, in particular:
1. That the world in which we live is intrinsically non-teleological (i.e., without 'ends' or 'goals').
2. That applying a 'continuous' understanding to ethics is a superior approach to practical ethics than using a 'discontinuous' understanding, particularly regarding the treatment of animals.
The question of teleology in nature is highly complex, so I won't deal with it now. Suffice it to say that the rise of the 'mechanistic' view of nature that developed in the early modern period (and has come to dominate our view of the cosmos), essentially eliminated, in the minds of many, any room for teleology in nature. Philosopher of mind Thomas Nagel critiques this mechanistic view of reality brilliantly in his book Mind and Cosmos. See here, here, here, and here for excerpts from this work.
I want to focus on the implications of Dawkins' argument for moral philosophy. The basic problem with Dawkins' 'continuous' mentality is that, instead of elevating the moral status of the great apes, it actually eliminates our ability to make meaningful moral distinctions at all. And making meaningful distinctions is essential to any form of reasoning.
If you argue that, because humans and chimps both evolved via an incremental, continuous process from the same ancestors, you cannot therefore make morally significant distinctions between them, then using this logic, you must also conclude that you cannot make meaningful moral distinctions between the value of chimps and and that of shrews (for example), between shrews and other mammals, between mammals and birds, between birds and reptiles, between reptiles and fish, between fish and plankton, between plankton and single-celled organisms and, (possibly) between single-celled organisms and pre-biotic chemical compounds.
Why not? Because, according to neo-Darwinism, each of these creatures evolved from common ancestors via an incremental, continuous biological process. It starts out as a few steps, then a few dozen, then a few hundred...thousand...million, etc. Each step in this process was just as small and (morally) insignificant as the step before it, and the step before that. Ultimately, you cannot make morally meaningful distinctions between any closely-related species. But all species are closely-related some some other species, which are closely-related to some other species, and so on. Any moral distinction you attempt to draw between a doctor providing anti-biotics to patients in order to kill (potentially) hundreds of thousands of bacteria infecting their body and, say. the Holocaust or the Cambodia killing fields is meaningless, if one accepts Dawkins' 'continuous mind' as the right way of thinking about the relative value of humans to other creatures.
There is, of course, a solution to this dilemma: Reject Dawkins premise. Acknowledge that there is something (indeed, many things) about human beings that make them morally unique - most significantly, the fact that human beings are capable of thinking of the value of life in moral terms, in stark contrast to other creatures. Other creatures may, indeed, be able to recognise 'appropriate behaviour' in a particular context and behave accordingly. And animals may consciously behave in altruistic ways, that we interpret as 'moral' behaviour. But animals themselves do not, and cannot, think of these actions as 'moral' in anything like the same sense that humans do. They simply lack the potential for moral reasoning that human beings innately have.
Surely, the fact that humans beings are the only species with the ability to think of behaviour and value in moral terms implies (no: necessitates) that humans have moral value that other creatures do not. Of course, once you recognise this, you must also recognise that humans, as the only morally-aware creatures on this planet, have a unique obligation to recognise the innate value of other creatures, both personally and legally.
Dawkins' 'continuous mind' undermines any meaningful discussion of our moral obligations toward other creatures. A 'discontinuous mind' is one of the pillars for sound reasoning about how we should treat other creatures, NOT its enemy.
In a sense, Dawkins' own argument (unwittingly) accepts my point. Dawkins clearly regards moral reasoning as highly significant. He is, after all, reasoning morally when he makes his argument (or trying to). Also, he is clearly addressing his arguments to humans, because we are the only creatures who are capable of understanding his argument and appreciating its significance (or insignificance). Thus, Dawkins' argument implicitly accepts the fundamental importance of being able to reason morally to arguments about the moral significance of animals. That is, he clearly views human beings' ability to reason morally as significant, even though his ideology apparently prevents him from acknowledging the unique moral significance of humans in the world.
Comments
Post a Comment