In a previous post, I wrote about some of the different types of arguments for the existence of God. In this post, I will elaborate on one type of argument: the cosmological argument. The cosmological argument has, typically, been regarded as the central argument for God's existence. At least, this appears to have been the view of philosophers such as Aristotle, Plotinus, al-Kindi, Avicenna (Ibn Sina), al-Ghazali, Averroes (Ibn Rushd), Moses Maimonides, Thomas Aquinas, John Duns Scotus, Samuel Clarke, Gottfried Leibniz, and many others. The purpose of the cosmological argument has been to argue from the existence of the cosmos (material reality) to the existence of a First Cause of the cosmos, that is (to use a number of the terms used): 'unmoved mover', 'necessary being', 'pure act', 'subsistent being itself', 'the One', etc. Each of these terms has a specific meaning within its metaphysical context, but they all essentially conclude to the same entity: a self-existent, eternal, immensely powerful (or omnipotent), immaterial Intellect that is the Creator of the universe.
There are many different cosmological arguments, hence it is necessary to classify them into different categories that show the similarities and differences between different arguments. However, classifying cosmological arguments is not simple. As I noted in the previous post, different arguments for God's existence often depend on different metaphysical frameworks, e.g. Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, Scholastic, rationalist, idealist, empiricist, analytic, etc. Unsurprisingly, then, different cosmological arguments also depend on different metaphysical frameworks. This makes categorizing them potentially quite difficult. Different philosophers in recent decades have tried categorizing them in different ways. In particular, I am aware of three different ways one can potentially categorise cosmological arguments. The first two are suggested by William Lane Craig in his excellent historical overview The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz. The third way is suggested by Edward Feser in an article entitled 'The New Atheists and the Cosmological Argument'.
The first is to categorise the arguments according to how they treat the possibility of infinite causal regresses. An infinite causal regress is a series of causes going back into infinity; it has no beginning and no end, it just goes on forever. Obviously, the question of whether such series can exist has some relevance to questions such as whether the universe had a beginning or whether the universe is self-existent, etc., so it is a significant issue - indeed the central issue - for certain versions of the cosmological argument. Craig notes (p. 282) that, using the role of infinite causal regresses in different cosmological arguments, it is possible to categorise them into three groups:
1. those that maintain the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress,
2. those that maintain the impossibility of an infinite essentially-ordered regress,
3. those that have no reference to infinite regresses at all.
Craig notes (p. 283) that the first type correspond to kalam-style arguments (such as the one outline in my previous post), the second type correspond to Aristotelian-Thomistic, Platonic and Neo-Platonic-style arguments, and the third type correspond to rationalist-style contingency arguments.
The second way you could organise cosmological arguments is according to the type of basic logical or metaphysical principle(s) the arguments use. Again, these can be categorised into three different groups:
1. arguments based on the principle of determination (PD),
2. arguments based on the principle of causality (CP),
3. arguments based on the principle of sufficient reason (PSR).
Craig notes (p. 283) that, again, the first type of argument corresponds to kalam-style arguments; the second type to Aristotelian-Thomistic and Neo-Platonic arguments and the third type to rationalist arguments.
The 'principle of determination' refers to a metaphysical principle used by Islamic philosophers in defending kalam arguments. According to Majid Fakhry, "this principle meant that since prior to the existence of the universe it was equally possible for it to be or not-to-be, a determinant (murajjih) whereby the possibility of a being could prevail over the possibility of not-being was required." (That is, something was needed to determine or choose the outcome.) The metaphysical 'principle of causality', which derives originally from Aristotle, has been stated in many forms, but the most basic is: 'Every event requires a cause', in which 'event' is understood as a change. The logical 'principle of sufficient reason', primarily used by rationalist metaphysicians such as Gottfried Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza, states that 'Everything must have a reason or cause'; in its strongest form 'everything' includes not just objects, but propositions, so even propositions must have a reason determining why they are true. The difference between these principles is crucial, Craig argues (p. 283-4), because confusing these principles can lead to the creation of pseudo-arguments that no-one would defend. For example, the argument most popular among atheists (i.e., the one they most like to refute) actually uses a 'principle' that is a confused mix of the CP and the PSR. It goes like this:
1. Everything that exists requires a cause.
2. The universe exists.
3. Therefore the universe requires a cause.
The atheist goes on to object that if everything requires a cause, then God (if God exists) requires a cause, so appealing to God to explain the existence of the universe is pointless. However, no defender of the cosmological argument has ever claimed that 'everything requires a cause' in the sense used in the argument above. What appears to have happened here is that David Hume (who first stated the argument in this form) has confused the CP with the PSR, and created an additional 'principle' that no one would defend, which actually contradicts all genuine forms of the cosmological argument, and which is almost certainly false.
In Hume's case, this appears to have been a genuine mistake, rather than a deliberate attempt to distort the argument. (Hume appears to have misinterpreted Rene Descartes' somewhat obscurely-worded version of the cosmological argument.) Whether the same can be said of all contemporary critics of the cosmological argument is a more difficult question. At the very least, it must be said that there is no excuse in the present day for atheists who continue to treat the pseudo-argument as a real version of the cosmological argument. Contemporary defenders of the cosmological argument have emphasised, again and again, that Hume's argument is not a genuine form of the cosmological argument, but many atheists apparently do not study the writings of contemporary theistic philosophers, preferring instead to study the writings of past atheist/agnostic philosophers such as Hume and Bertrand Russell, and simply imitate their arguments. (One can see this pattern in the writings of Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Jerry Coyne, Simon Blackburn, Julian Baggini, etc.)
The third approach to classifying cosmological arguments is suggested by Edward Feser. Feser points out that all versions of the cosmological arguments make some kind of basic logical or metaphysical distinction that is crucial to the argument. For example, Aristotelian-Thomistic arguments draw a distinction between act and potency (actuality/potentiality). This basic metaphysical distinction is fundamental to Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics and underpins several versions of the cosmological argument. Other key distinctions used in cosmological arguments are the simple/composite distinction used in Neo-Platonist cosmological arguments, the contingent/necessary distinction used in contingency arguments and the eternal/temporal distinction used in kalam arguments. Feser, therefore, arranges cosmological arguments into four categories:
1. Act/potency arguments,
2. Simple/composite arguments,
3. Necessary/contingent arguments,
4. Eternal/temporal arguments.
This approach is useful, because it doesn't lump Aristotelian-Thomistic and Neo-Platonic arguments in together, but recognises the basic difference between them, whereas both of Craig's approaches lump them together. Although both use a version of the causal principle, their approaches to the argument are fundamentally different. On the other hand, Feser's approach lumps together two very different types of argument under the category of necessary/contingent-style arguments. Both medieval philosophers like Avicenna and Aquinas, on the one hand, and rationalist philosophers like Leibniz and Clarke, on the other, use the necessary/contingent distinction; but (as Feser himself is a pains to point out) what medieval philosophers meant by 'necessary' and 'contingent' is radically different from what rationalist philosophers meant. Rationalist philosophers meant 'logically necessary', i.e., 2 + 2 = 4; whereas, medieval philosophers meant necessary in the sense of 'incorruptible', i.e., not intrinsically prone to change, and 'self-existent', i.e., not requiring a cause. So, for the rationalist, something is contingent if it is not a logically necessary truth; whereas for the medieval philosopher something is contingent if it is corruptible and, consequently, dependent on something else for its continuing existence. Although there are similarities between these two uses of these terms, the differences are much more significant to the cosmological argument (e.g., rationalists would use a version of the PSR; medieval philosophers would use a version of the CP).
So, after the above discussion, it is clear that classifying cosmological arguments (and all theistic arguments) is not a simple thing, but there are similarities between the different types of arguments that makes it possible to classify them. Hopefully, in a series of posts, I will be able to discuss several different types of cosmological arguments in the following weeks (or months). I will not follow any of the three approaches to classification outlined above but, rather, use my own adapted classification system. This will include:
1. Pseudo-arguments. That is, false versions of the cosmological argument commonly critiqued by atheists and agnostics today. I will primarily study these to show what the cosmological argument does not say.
2. Act/potency arguments. That is, Aristotelian-Thomistic arguments; specifically the First of Thomas Aquinas' Five Ways in the Summa Theologiae.
3. Simple/composite arguments, specifically the approach taken by Plotinus in the Enneads.
4. Medieval necessary/contingent arguments, specifically the approach taken by Avicenna and Aquinas (in his Third Way).
5. Kalam Arguments. That is, those that draw a distinction between eternal and temporal being, and argue that material reality is temporal, not eternal. Specifically, I will discuss William Lane Craig's contemporary defense of this argument.
6. Rationalist necessary/contingent arguments, specifically the approach taken by Leibniz in the Monadology.
There are many different cosmological arguments, hence it is necessary to classify them into different categories that show the similarities and differences between different arguments. However, classifying cosmological arguments is not simple. As I noted in the previous post, different arguments for God's existence often depend on different metaphysical frameworks, e.g. Aristotelian, Neoplatonic, Scholastic, rationalist, idealist, empiricist, analytic, etc. Unsurprisingly, then, different cosmological arguments also depend on different metaphysical frameworks. This makes categorizing them potentially quite difficult. Different philosophers in recent decades have tried categorizing them in different ways. In particular, I am aware of three different ways one can potentially categorise cosmological arguments. The first two are suggested by William Lane Craig in his excellent historical overview The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz. The third way is suggested by Edward Feser in an article entitled 'The New Atheists and the Cosmological Argument'.
The first is to categorise the arguments according to how they treat the possibility of infinite causal regresses. An infinite causal regress is a series of causes going back into infinity; it has no beginning and no end, it just goes on forever. Obviously, the question of whether such series can exist has some relevance to questions such as whether the universe had a beginning or whether the universe is self-existent, etc., so it is a significant issue - indeed the central issue - for certain versions of the cosmological argument. Craig notes (p. 282) that, using the role of infinite causal regresses in different cosmological arguments, it is possible to categorise them into three groups:
1. those that maintain the impossibility of an infinite temporal regress,
2. those that maintain the impossibility of an infinite essentially-ordered regress,
3. those that have no reference to infinite regresses at all.
Craig notes (p. 283) that the first type correspond to kalam-style arguments (such as the one outline in my previous post), the second type correspond to Aristotelian-Thomistic, Platonic and Neo-Platonic-style arguments, and the third type correspond to rationalist-style contingency arguments.
The second way you could organise cosmological arguments is according to the type of basic logical or metaphysical principle(s) the arguments use. Again, these can be categorised into three different groups:
1. arguments based on the principle of determination (PD),
2. arguments based on the principle of causality (CP),
3. arguments based on the principle of sufficient reason (PSR).
Craig notes (p. 283) that, again, the first type of argument corresponds to kalam-style arguments; the second type to Aristotelian-Thomistic and Neo-Platonic arguments and the third type to rationalist arguments.
The 'principle of determination' refers to a metaphysical principle used by Islamic philosophers in defending kalam arguments. According to Majid Fakhry, "this principle meant that since prior to the existence of the universe it was equally possible for it to be or not-to-be, a determinant (murajjih) whereby the possibility of a being could prevail over the possibility of not-being was required." (That is, something was needed to determine or choose the outcome.) The metaphysical 'principle of causality', which derives originally from Aristotle, has been stated in many forms, but the most basic is: 'Every event requires a cause', in which 'event' is understood as a change. The logical 'principle of sufficient reason', primarily used by rationalist metaphysicians such as Gottfried Leibniz and Baruch Spinoza, states that 'Everything must have a reason or cause'; in its strongest form 'everything' includes not just objects, but propositions, so even propositions must have a reason determining why they are true. The difference between these principles is crucial, Craig argues (p. 283-4), because confusing these principles can lead to the creation of pseudo-arguments that no-one would defend. For example, the argument most popular among atheists (i.e., the one they most like to refute) actually uses a 'principle' that is a confused mix of the CP and the PSR. It goes like this:
1. Everything that exists requires a cause.
2. The universe exists.
3. Therefore the universe requires a cause.
The atheist goes on to object that if everything requires a cause, then God (if God exists) requires a cause, so appealing to God to explain the existence of the universe is pointless. However, no defender of the cosmological argument has ever claimed that 'everything requires a cause' in the sense used in the argument above. What appears to have happened here is that David Hume (who first stated the argument in this form) has confused the CP with the PSR, and created an additional 'principle' that no one would defend, which actually contradicts all genuine forms of the cosmological argument, and which is almost certainly false.
In Hume's case, this appears to have been a genuine mistake, rather than a deliberate attempt to distort the argument. (Hume appears to have misinterpreted Rene Descartes' somewhat obscurely-worded version of the cosmological argument.) Whether the same can be said of all contemporary critics of the cosmological argument is a more difficult question. At the very least, it must be said that there is no excuse in the present day for atheists who continue to treat the pseudo-argument as a real version of the cosmological argument. Contemporary defenders of the cosmological argument have emphasised, again and again, that Hume's argument is not a genuine form of the cosmological argument, but many atheists apparently do not study the writings of contemporary theistic philosophers, preferring instead to study the writings of past atheist/agnostic philosophers such as Hume and Bertrand Russell, and simply imitate their arguments. (One can see this pattern in the writings of Daniel Dennett, Sam Harris, Jerry Coyne, Simon Blackburn, Julian Baggini, etc.)
The third approach to classifying cosmological arguments is suggested by Edward Feser. Feser points out that all versions of the cosmological arguments make some kind of basic logical or metaphysical distinction that is crucial to the argument. For example, Aristotelian-Thomistic arguments draw a distinction between act and potency (actuality/potentiality). This basic metaphysical distinction is fundamental to Aristotelian and Scholastic metaphysics and underpins several versions of the cosmological argument. Other key distinctions used in cosmological arguments are the simple/composite distinction used in Neo-Platonist cosmological arguments, the contingent/necessary distinction used in contingency arguments and the eternal/temporal distinction used in kalam arguments. Feser, therefore, arranges cosmological arguments into four categories:
1. Act/potency arguments,
2. Simple/composite arguments,
3. Necessary/contingent arguments,
4. Eternal/temporal arguments.
This approach is useful, because it doesn't lump Aristotelian-Thomistic and Neo-Platonic arguments in together, but recognises the basic difference between them, whereas both of Craig's approaches lump them together. Although both use a version of the causal principle, their approaches to the argument are fundamentally different. On the other hand, Feser's approach lumps together two very different types of argument under the category of necessary/contingent-style arguments. Both medieval philosophers like Avicenna and Aquinas, on the one hand, and rationalist philosophers like Leibniz and Clarke, on the other, use the necessary/contingent distinction; but (as Feser himself is a pains to point out) what medieval philosophers meant by 'necessary' and 'contingent' is radically different from what rationalist philosophers meant. Rationalist philosophers meant 'logically necessary', i.e., 2 + 2 = 4; whereas, medieval philosophers meant necessary in the sense of 'incorruptible', i.e., not intrinsically prone to change, and 'self-existent', i.e., not requiring a cause. So, for the rationalist, something is contingent if it is not a logically necessary truth; whereas for the medieval philosopher something is contingent if it is corruptible and, consequently, dependent on something else for its continuing existence. Although there are similarities between these two uses of these terms, the differences are much more significant to the cosmological argument (e.g., rationalists would use a version of the PSR; medieval philosophers would use a version of the CP).
So, after the above discussion, it is clear that classifying cosmological arguments (and all theistic arguments) is not a simple thing, but there are similarities between the different types of arguments that makes it possible to classify them. Hopefully, in a series of posts, I will be able to discuss several different types of cosmological arguments in the following weeks (or months). I will not follow any of the three approaches to classification outlined above but, rather, use my own adapted classification system. This will include:
1. Pseudo-arguments. That is, false versions of the cosmological argument commonly critiqued by atheists and agnostics today. I will primarily study these to show what the cosmological argument does not say.
2. Act/potency arguments. That is, Aristotelian-Thomistic arguments; specifically the First of Thomas Aquinas' Five Ways in the Summa Theologiae.
3. Simple/composite arguments, specifically the approach taken by Plotinus in the Enneads.
4. Medieval necessary/contingent arguments, specifically the approach taken by Avicenna and Aquinas (in his Third Way).
5. Kalam Arguments. That is, those that draw a distinction between eternal and temporal being, and argue that material reality is temporal, not eternal. Specifically, I will discuss William Lane Craig's contemporary defense of this argument.
6. Rationalist necessary/contingent arguments, specifically the approach taken by Leibniz in the Monadology.
Comments
Post a Comment