Contra Dawkins, Part 5

Part V: id quo maius cogitari non potest

The ontological argument is somewhat unique among arguments for God's existence. Typically, theistic arguments are a posteriori arguments, that is to say, arguments reasoning from the observation or experience of certain features of the world to the existence of a Cause of these features. After this, the theistic philosopher will 'unpack' this notion of a Cause to show that it must have many of the features attributed to God. By contrast, the ontological argument reasons from the definition of God as 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' to God's existence.

Kenneth Himma summarises Anselm’ ontological argument in this way:

1.      It is a conceptual truth (or, so to speak, true by definition) that God is a being than which none greater can be imagined (that is, the greatest possible being that can be imagined).

2.      God exists as an idea in the mind.

3.      A being that exists as an idea in the mind and in reality is, other things being equal, greater than a being that exists only as an idea in the mind.

4.      Thus, if God exists only as an idea in the mind, then we can imagine something that is greater than God (that is, a greatest possible being that does exist).

5.      But we cannot imagine something that is greater than God (for it is a contradiction to suppose that we can imagine a being greater than the greatest possible being that can be imagined.)

6.      Therefore, God exists.

Intuitively, one can think of the argument as being powered by two ideas. The first, expressed by Premise 2, is that we have a coherent idea of a being that instantiates all of the perfections. Otherwise put, Premise 2 asserts that we have a coherent idea of a being that instantiates every property that makes a being greater, other things being equal, than it would have been without that property (such properties are also known as "great-making" properties). Premise 3 asserts that existence is a perfection or great-making property.

Accordingly, the very concept of a being that instantiates all the perfections implies that it exists. Suppose B is a being that instantiates all the perfections and suppose B doesn't exist (in reality). Since Premise 3 asserts that existence is a perfection, it follows that B lacks a perfection. But this contradicts the assumption that B is a being that instantiates all the perfections. Thus, according to this reasoning, it follows that B exists (‘Anselm: Ontological Argument for God’s Existence’, Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy, n.a.)

End quote. I would say one thing regarding Himma's summary: he states that Anselm defines God as 'a being than which none greater can be imagined'. This particular phrasing is misleading, as being able to imagine (i.e., create a mental image of) something is different from being able to think of it, i.e., form a concept of it. The typical translation is of id quo maius cogitari non potest is 'that than which nothing greater can be thought'. You can think of (i.e., understand the idea of) a chiliagon (a thousand-sided figure), but it is extremely difficult to create a mental image of such an object. This distinction is crucial, for Anslem would deny that humans can imagine God. Indeed, the very idea is absurd, as to imagine something is, as I have said, to create a mental image of it, which necessarily implies that it has a particular shape, colour, size, etc. God, as immaterial being, would not have such characteristics. Similarly, 'triangle' is a concept that, because it is an abstraction that by definition encompasses all triangles, it is impossible to create a particular mental image of triangularity that would not include some triangle (e.g., a scalene triangle), while excluding others (e.g., isosceles or equilateral triangles). Himma, and many modern commentators, confuse 'thought' with 'imagination' and so read Anselm incorrectly.

Dawkins has a lot to say about the ontological argument (The God Delusion, pp. 80-84), despite showing little understanding of the nature and history of the argument. He starts off his discussion by calling the argument 'infantile'. I have several problems with the ontological argument, but to call it infantile is simply stupid. Some of the most brilliant philosophers of the last thousand years have debated the ontological argument; many rejected the argument as invalid (e.g., Gaunilo, Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant). None of them regarded the argument as 'infantile'. Dawkins appears to be trying to prejudice his readers against the argument from the outset. Perhaps he is just annoyed that Anselm referred to atheists as 'fools', quoting Psalm 14: 'The fool has said in his heart, "There is no God".' I don't think Dawkins, of all people, has any right to complain about insults, given his tendency to regard religious theists as borderline insane, and then uses his own insult as an excuse not to take seriously the arguments of religious thinkers.

Commenting on Bertrand Russell’s brief moment of clarity (?) regarding the validity of the ontological, Dawkins states:  

Bertrand Russell (no fool) interestingly said, 'It is easier to feel convinced that [the ontological argument] must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies.' Russell himself, as a young man was briefly convinced by it:

I remember the precise moment, one day in 1894, as I was walking along Trinity lane, when I saw in a flash (or thought I saw) that the ontological argument is valid. I had gone out to buy a tin of tobacco; on my way back, I suddenly threw it up in the air, and exclaimed as I caught it: 'Great Scott, the ontological argument is sound.'

Why, I wonder, didn't he say something like: 'Great Scott, the ontological argument seems to be plausible. But isn't it too good to be true that a grand truth about the cosmos should follow from a mere word game?’” (p. 81).

Regarding this comment it should first be noted that the conclusion of the ontological argument would not be a ‘grand truth about the cosmos’ - in fact, the argument says nothing about the cosmos, at all - but rather ‘a grand truth about reality’ or, more precisely, ‘a grand truth about God', i.e., that God exists. The cosmos is physical: you couldn’t really learn about it without, at minimum, making some observations of it.  God is certainly not material – pure intellect, so to speak. Therefore, it might be possible (theoretically) to reason to God’s existence solely through the application of intellect. That is, actually, the point of the ontological argument, as originally conceived by Anselm: to discover a process of reasoning by which people might know that God exists without knowing any facts about Creation.

Secondly, the ontological argument is either 'valid' or 'invalid', not 'plausible' or 'implausible'. Dawkins states that the ontological argument 'seems to be plausible', but then rejects is on the grounds it seems to good to be true, thus suggesting that it is actually highly implausible. Plausibility, however, is a criterion used for evidence-based or probabilistic arguments, and is not a criterion used for assessing deductive arguments, as deductive arguments are either logically valid or invalid. The ontological argument is a deductive argument, and so is either valid or invalid. A deductive argument is valid if the premises are true and the conclusion follows logically from the truth of the premises. This is not a minor point, as it illustrates Dawkins' confused approach to philosophical argument: he keeps wanting to treat philosophical arguments as if they are scientific arguments. This is a basic category error.  Because it is virtually impossible to make a deductive empirical argument, scientists assess arguments according to probability or plausibility, not strict logical validity. Philosophers, on the other hand, have used deductive arguments frequently, and with great success, for millennia. Talk about 'plausibility' only confuses the issue, or (as appears to be the case here) reveals the speaker to be confused.

Thirdly, sniping about ‘word games’ doesn’t refute the argument. Dawkins' reaction here is understandable and forgivable, but not reasonable. My own reaction was similar when I first encountered the ontological argument some years ago. In fact, this is probably the initial reaction of most people who encounter it. However, in the end, after the bluster, it is important to realise that you actually have to show why an argument like the ontological argument, allegedly a mere ‘word game’, couldn’t possibly give you any true insight into the existence and nature of God. That is, you must highlight the logical flaw in the argument.

Dawkins references Zeno paradoxes, a series of arguments designed to show why change is impossible, to suggest that, just as Zeno's paradoxes seemed impossible to solve but had to be rejected because Zeno's arguments led to the ridiculous conclusion that the change we observe at every moment isn't real, so too - even if we cannot refute Anselm's argument - it can still be rejecteed as mere 'word games'. The problem with Dawkins' analogy here is that the ancient Greeks, specifically Aristotle, showed exactly why Zeno's arguments were flawed - in fact, not just flawed, but self-refuting. Dawkins seems to think that merely drawing an analogy between the ontological argument and Zeno's paradoxes is enough to cast doubt on the former. However, Anselm's argument is not like Zeno's paradoxes: (1) it doesn't appear to be self-refuting (at least Dawkins doesn't show it to be so), (2) it's conclusion doesn't (couldn't) contradict our direct sensory experience, as sensory experience is irrelevant here.

As Russell writes, and Dawkins misunderstands, “It is easier to feel convinced that [the ontological argument] must be fallacious than it is to find out precisely where the fallacy lies” (The God Delusion, p. 81). Dawkins seems to assume that feeling that the argument must be false should be enough to refute the argument. He fails to see the significance of the fact that a philosopher of Russell’s calibre – when he truly understands the argument and applies his mind to it – can’t find the fault in it! That ought to show the foolishness of Dawkins' statement that the argument is 'infantile'. Dawkins response is a little different: 'I suspect that he [Russell] was an exaggeratedly fair-minded atheist, over-eager to be disillusioned if logic seemed to require it' (p. 82). Now, I've read many of Russell's anti-religious essays. Never have I gotten the impression that Russell was an 'exaggeratedly fair-minded atheist'. Quite the opposite. In virtually all his writings, Russell is typically dismissive of theistic arguments, and rarely exhibits any real understanding of them, e.g. his treatment of Thomas Aquinas. His attitude is more like Dawkins' own than like some imaginary 'fair-minded atheist'.

Overall, it seems Dawkins’ commitment to a strict empiricism is the primary motivator for his ridicule of this argument: “My own feeling, to the contrary, would have been an automatic, deep suspicion of any line of reasoning that reached such a significant conclusion without feeding in a single piece of data from the real world.” (The God Delusion, p. 82). 'Real world' here apparently means 'physical world'. This is curious, as that would imply that the world of thoughts and ideas is not part of the 'real world', in Dawkins' thinking. Despite his poor phrasing and materialistic bias, I sympathise generally with Dawkins' point here, but he fails to go into any detail as to why an a posteriori argument would necessarily be preferable to an a priori one. (Put in normal speak: Why should a purely conceptual argument necessarily be considered inferior to an argument based on some observed facts about the nature of physical reality?) Again, a feeling or suspicion, regardless of how deep or automatic it might be, is not a substitute for finding a real flaw in the logic of the argument. Dawkins acknowledges that his proclivity for empirical arguments is probably the result of his being a scientist, not a philosopher. This is surely true, and it is also part of the reason why scientists should not write about philosophical topics without doing some serious research into philosophy first. To quote that great sage Jedi Master Yoda, “You must unlearn what you have learned.” To discuss philosophy properly, you have to relearn how to think about the world – to find a way of thinking beyond naive empiricism.

On the subject of needing 'a single piece of data from the real world' (emphasis mine), by which Dawkins apparently means the material world, rather than the world of the intellect, I would make three points. Firstly, to assume, as Dawkins does, that the physical world is more real than the world of the intellect is clearly question-begging, and at the heart of many of Dawkins' most egregious errors. Secondly, any knowledge of physical reality must presuppose the immaterial world of the intellect - a world of abstract ideas and transcendent concepts such as 'being', 'truth', etc. - even if much actual knowledge of reality comes primarily from sensory data. Thirdly, no less an intellect than Thomas Aquinas would have agreed with Dawkins that knowledge of the existence of God must be derived from knowledge of God's effects, i.e., creations. That is, if God exists, it must be possible to reason from the existence of the physical creation to the Creator. So, perhaps, Dawkins is close to the truth, though, considering his treatment of Aquinas earlier in the book, we can assume that Dawkins has no idea why. (See below for a discussion of Aquinas' own objection to the ontological argument.)

Russell (again, quoted by Dawkins), comes closer to a real objection: “The real question is: Is there anything we can think of which, by the mere fact that we can think of it, is shown to exist outside our thought?” (p. 82). Of course, the point of Anselm’s argument is to show there is such a being, so simply asking the question is not a refutation; but, at least, Russell is getting closer the real issue, while Dawkins seems to be still feeling his way through.

Then we come to Dawkins’ most substantial objection; or, rather, Normal Malcolm’s most substantial objection:

The doctrine that existence is a perfection is remarkably queer. It makes sense and is true to say that my future house will be a better one if it is insulated than if it is not insulated; but what could it mean to say that it will be a better house if it exists than if it does not? (p. 83).

This may, indeed, seem odd, at first glance. But, then again: How could something that is real not be greater than the mere idea of something? And how could Dawkins really suggest that Anselm is being ‘slippery’ for saying so (p. 83)? It seems that it is those who object to the argument along these lines who are being ‘slippery’. In most every other context, if a person were offered the mere idea of something, in substitute for the real thing, they’d cry ‘cheat!’, and quite right, too! No, Anselm has the best of this dispute.

It is interesting that Dawkins completely fails to mention that Norman Malcolm was actually one of the foremost defenders of the ontological argument in the twentieth century. Had Dawkins done his research properly, he could not have missed this fact. Dawkins never mentions or discusses Malcolm's reconstruction and defense of Anselm's argument (or, rather, arguments - Malcolm concluded that Anselm defended two slightly different versions of the argument in his writings). Instead, Dawkins' use of the above quote seems to be intended to imply that Malcolm rejected the ontological argument, when his published writings show that he clearly did not.

From there, Dawkins moves from plausible criticisms to ludicrous ones. Dawkins quotes Douglas Gasking’s attempted reductio ad absurdum of the logic of ontological arguments. Gasking suggests that, “The greater the disability (or handicap) of the creator, the more impressive the achievement.” And that non-existence would be “the most formidable handicap” for a creator. He concludes: “An existing God therefore would not be a being greater than which a greater cannot be conceived because an even more formidable and incredible creator would be a God which did not exist” (p. 83).

Now, if you were tempted to respond to Anselm’s argument by saying, ‘That’s odd!’ or ‘That’s bizarre!’, you could be forgiven. If you’re tempted to respond to Gasking redictio with, ‘That’s insane!’, then you’d be right on the money. Anselm might have been odd, but Gasking is certifiable – and Dawkins should join him in the same psych ward. In the first place, a disability or handicap is a deficiency or imperfection, and a maximally great being by definition could not contain any imperfections/deficiencies. The very notion of a ‘deficiency’ or ‘disability’ is directly opposed to the notion of ‘perfection’ - which is intrinsic to the idea of maximal greatness! Secondly, a non-existent being could not be 'greater' than one that exists – because it doesn’t freakin' exist!!! It can’t ‘be’ in the first place, let alone ‘be greater’. This is sloppy beyond words. Actually, there are words for it. I won’t use them here.

But Dawkins is still not done humiliating himself: “I've forgotten the details, but I once piqued a gathering of theologians and philosophers by adapting the ontological argument to prove that pigs can fly.” (p. 84). Flying pigs? If Dawkins thinks he can use the logic of the ontological argument to argue that pigs fly, then he has totally misunderstood the argument. Perhaps the weirdest thing about this is that, after having made the mistake once in front of a auditorium of theologians and philosophers, and being corrected by them, Dawkins still repeats the same claim - with pride! There are none so blind...you know the rest.

Then comes this odd comment: “They felt the need to resort to Modal Logic to prove I was wrong” (p. 84). This comment shows Dawkins' ignroance of the history and variety of ontological arguments. The oldest, and most famous, version is the Anselmian argument, famously critiqued by Gaunilo and Thomas Aquinas. Other widely-discussed version are Descartes and Leibniz's arguments, famously critiqued by Immanuel Kant. The most prominent version of the argument today, however, is the modal ontological argument. It is called so, not surprisingly, because this ontological argument is based on modal logic. If the ‘they’ Dawkins refers to, whoever they were exactly, didn’t use modal logic that would be odd, considering the prevalence of the modal version of the argument today. The fact that Dawkins thinks this final comment reveals the desperation of defenders of the ontological argument, only further reveals his ignorance and his failure to properly engage with the argument. So does his failure to explain what he thinks is so wrong with modal logic. (There are actually numerous versions of modal logic, the most popular today being Lewisian modal logic. Serious philosophers have criticised different versions of modal logic. Dawkins, however, reveals no familiarity with the subject.) It’s interesting how many of Dawkins’ slap-down arguments come back to bite him. Despite the battering he gets, he remains blissfully unteachable.

Had Dawkins really been interested in contemporary discussions of the ontological argument, he would have read Alvin Plantinga’s God and Other Minds (Cornell University Press, 1967) and The Nature of Necessity (Oxford University Press, 1974) for details on the modal ontological argument. He would also have read Graham Oppy’s Ontological Arguments and Belief in God (Cambridge University Press, 1995), which is the best critique of ontological arguments by an atheist in print.

Unfortunately, Dawkins appears to be completely unaware of the the one objection to the ontological argument that truly gets at the heart of the problem - an objection originated by Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Contra Gentiles and Summa Theologiae. Aquinas' objection, put simply, comes down to the point that, if God exists, God's essence (nature) is beyond human comprehension, and, if we cannot comprehend what God is, then we cannot know a priori if God's existence is possible. Consequently, the only way to know if God exists, is to reason from creation to the existence of a Creator. 

A key presupposition of the ontological argument is that we can know a priori that the existence of God is, at least, possible. That is, the assumption of the possibility of the existence of maximally great being (or 'that than which nothing greater can be thought', as Anselm put it) is the first premise of the ontological argument. Dawkins' fellow New Atheist, A.C. Grayling realises (in The God Argument) that the first premise is crucial. Unfortunately, Grayling assumes that simply denying the possibility of the existence of God, so defined, is sufficient to refute the argument. Actually, in order to deny outright this possibility, Grayling would need to show that the concept of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' or a 'maximally great being' is incoherent. Others have tried this, such as the late Prof. C. D. Broad (1887-1971). Grayling failed to do so.

Alternatively, Grayling could have followed Aquinas, in pointing out that defenders of the ontological argument fail to demonstrate positively that we can know a priori the possibility of the existence of God, as defined by Anselm. Instead, they attempt to demonstrate that possibility by arguing that it has not been shown to be impossible. However, pointing out that something hasn't been shown to be impossible is not necessarily the same thing as knowing that it is possible. As the argument is a positive argument for God's existence, the onus is on the defender of the ontological argument to show that we can know a priori that the existence of God is possible. The Thomist (a follower of the thought of Thomas Aquins) would point out that, because a complete quidditive knowledge of God (i.e., a knowledge of God's essence) is not possible for the human intellect, we cannot know a priori that God's existence is possible. Instead, Aquinas concludes that a posteriori argument, exemplified in the Five Ways, is the proper method of reasoning to God's existence. (See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange's God: His Existence and His Nature, 5th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 68-70 for a fuller discussion of this objection. Alterntively, see his The One God: A Commentary on the First Part of St. Thomas' Theological Summa, Chapter 2, Article 1.)

Ultimately, I think the debate over the ontological argument must end in a stalemate. Those seeking to refute the argument outright need to show a priori that the existence of 'that than which nothing greater can be thought' is impossible, by showing that the very concept is incoherent. They have not done so. (Or, at least, they have not done so in any way that is persuasive, the best attempt at doing so being Broad's critique.) However, those seeking to defend the argument must show positively that we can know a priori that God's existence, as defined by Anselm, is possible. They, also, have not done so. So, stalemate. Of course, an argument that ultimately ends in stalemate is not a very persuasive argument. So, I don't regard the ontological argument as a good argument for God's existence.

However, all of this appears to be beyond Dawkins' ken. He doesn't understand the ontological argument - probably because he hasn't studied it in any real depth. It is not surprising, then that he doesn't know how to refute it properly. It may also be that Dawkins, who has spent so much of his life looking at reality one way - through his materialistic view of science - is psychologically incapable of looking at reality differently - through the lens of philosophy. It is interesting that, in a debate with Christian mathematician and philosopher John Lennox, Dawkins once commented that he became a scientist because he was looking for answers to the 'big questions'. Even back in his teens, Dawkins failed to understand that science, precisely because of its focus of physical reality, cannot answer many of the big questions, such as 'Does God exist?'. This seemingly simple error early in his life, has lead to substantial errors over the course of his intellectual development.

Other Arguments

The Argument from Beauty

Following his discussion of the ontological argument, on page 85 Dawkins lists a series of ‘arguments’ he pretends theists actually use. In reality, no serious theistic scholar has defended these arguments - certainly not as they are stated in Dawkins' book. The fact that the arguments come from a website entitled ‘godlessgeeks.com’, should have been a clear sign to steer clear. Dawkins, however, remains as clueless as the rats in ‘The Pied-Piper of Hamlin’. No section of his book more clearly exhibits his total lack of regard for serious argument than page 85.

Dawkins then goes on to discuss what he calls the ‘argument from beauty’, the ‘argument from religious experience’ and the ‘argument from scripture’. Unlike the ‘arguments’ on the infamous ‘Page 85’, these arguments have been defended by various theistic philosophers and apologists. True to form, Dawkins dumbs them down sufficiently so that he can refute them without really trying. Indeed, his discussion of these arguments is pretty dull.

Against the ‘argument form beauty’, you get the typical ‘atheists can appreciate beautiful things, too’ response ('Obviously, Beetoven's late quartets are sublime...They are sublime if God is there and they are sublime if he isn't...A great conductor is credited with saying: 'If you have Mozart to listen to, why would you need God?',' p. 86.). Unfortunately, many popular religious apologists and preachers open themselves up to this response by failing to properly present the argument. Classically, the argument from beauty was not simply a subjective ‘wow!’ response, but a questioning of whether the concept of ‘beauty’ has any objective meaning in the absence of a transcendent reality, whether that transcendent reality be theistic or Platonic. For example, Plato's Socrates makes this, quite famous, statement in the Phaedo: "if anything is beautiful besides absolute beauty, it is beautiful for no other reason than because it partakes of absolute beauty." The point here is that beauty is an ideal. Ideals are immaterial, not merely physical, even if they are reflected imperfectly in physical beauty. By 'transcendent' or 'absolute' reality, is meant reality beyond the merely physical. If nothing exists except ‘matter and the void’, as ancient atomists put it, then the concept of beauty loses all objective meaning. Contrary to Dawkins comments in The God Delusion, serious defenses of this argument have been made by theistic philosophers. The reader should check out Alexander Pruss' 'The Cosmos as a Work of Art', Peter Williams' 'Aesthetic Arguments for the Existence of God', Eleanor Stump's 'Beauty as a Road to God' and Russell Howell's 'Does Mathematical Beauty Pose Problems for Naturalism?'.

Given physicalism, beauty becomes an illusion or epiphenomenon caused simply chemical reactions in the brain that are triggered by the combination of certain colours and patterns. It is difficult to see how such a worldview could inspire the beauty of Mozart or Haydn's music. In fact, as Western civilization has become more secular, music and art have become increasingly vulgar. Partly, this is 'the market', which (contrary to Dawkins' suggestion) does not typically inspire great art, like that of Michelangelo. Dawkins argues that, had secular forces, in a non-religious culture, been behind the funding for Michelangelo, his work would have been just as inspiring and beautiful. The history of modern and postmodern art would seem to be strong evidence against that hypothesis.

The influence of secular philosophies has tended to downplay the importance of 'beauty', as the concept doesn't fit well within modern materialistic and postmodern relativistic worldviews. In its place, a kind of aesthetic relativism has taken root. Of course, if – as moderns (and postmoderns) are fond of saying – ‘beauty is in the eye of the beholder’, i.e., the ideal of beauty is completely subjective, then the argument from beauty is seemingly nullified. Along with that, of course, the ideal of beauty becomes impoverished. In such a culture, such great classics as the work of Beethoven or Shakespeare (favourites of mine) could never have been created. For those who accept that beauty is a real feature of the world, the argument from beauty should be taken much more seriously than Dawkins appreciates.

The Argument from Religious Experience
Against the ‘argument from religious experience’ - what Dawkins calls 'the argument from personal experience' - you get the typical ‘religious experience is nothing more than an illusion caused by wishful thinking or poor mental health’ response. This is a complex argument, and there are sophisticated and unsophisticated versions of it. Dawkins spends the entirety of his discussion attacking the unsophisticated version of the argument: 'You think you have experienced God directly?...Individuals in asylums think they are Napoleon or Charlie Chaplin...Religious experiences are only different in that the people who claim them are more numerous' (p. 88). Actually they are different in one crucial way: the people who claim to have religious experiences are not typically insane; while people who think they are Charlie Chaplin are. Most people who think that there is a global conspiracy against them or that God told them to murder people have serious underlying psychological or neurological disorders. By contrast (and in direct contradiction to Dawkins' main contention), research shows that religious people tend to have better mental health than non-religious people. So Dawkins' continued insistence that religious belief is connected to psychological issues is simply not correct, and to suggest that all 'religious experiences' can be explained away as a peculiar form of neurological disorder is not plausible.

Suffice it to say that just because a religious experience might be an illusion brought on by wishful thinking or ill health, does not mean that it is or has to be an illusion. As we don’t have access to other persons' subjective experiences, claiming that we know that their experiences are just an illusion is clearly question-begging. Again, only if you assume materialism can you be sure that all religious experiences must be false. And you can't assume materialism in order to refute an argument for theism without committing the fallacy of petitio principii - admittedly a popular fallacy among anti-religious polemicists.

However, I would say that as an objective argument for theism, the argument from religious experience has some serious problems, precisely because such experiences are subjective. At best, you might be able to argue that your personal religious experience was so real – as real as any knowledge you might gain through your senses – that it provides sufficient ground for personal belief. Even here, though, there’s a problem. Suppose two individuals – a Christian and a Muslim, say – had very similar religious experiences. The Muslim’s experience is believed to confirm the truth of Islam. The Christian's experience is believed to confirm the truth of the Christian gospel. They are each equally convinced of the validity of their experiences. Logically, they cannot both be right. Either (1) both experiences were illusions, as Dawkins would claim, (2) one of them has had a false experience; or (3) both were real, but one of them misinterpreted their experience. Objectively, in the absence of any evidence of mental health issues, there is no way of determining which of these options is correct. Consequently, I am not a fan of the argument from religious experience, though the argument is more intellectually interesting than Dawkins realises.