Contra Dawkins, Part 7

Part VII: Darwin’s Unwitting Nemesis, or Paley Reborn

William Paley died in 1805. He was one of the greatest intellects of his generation. Charles Darwin was born in 1809. He would become perhaps the most influential figure of the modern era. The two men never met, never talked, never wrote to each other. Paley had no idea that his Natural Theology would be used as a punching bag by atheists for the next two centuries, and more. Or, at least, he had no idea why that would be so. For that, he had Charles Darwin to thank. For Paley, unwittingly, was Darwin’s greatest nemesis; and Darwin, consciously, wrote his Origin of Species, at least in part, as a refutation of Paley’s work.

What was Paley's argument, that it attracted so much attention? See below:

In crossing a heath, suppose I pitched my foot against a stone, and were asked how the stone came to be there, I might possibly answer, that, for any thing I knew to the contrary, it had lain there for ever: nor would it perhaps be very easy to shew the absurdity of this answer. But suppose I had found a watch upon the ground, and it should be enquired how the watch happened to be in that place, I should hardly think of the answer which I had before given, that, for any thing I knew, the watch might have always been there. Yet why should not this answer serve for the watch, as well as for the stone? Why is it not as admissible in the second case, as in the first? For this reason, and for no other, viz. that, when we come to inspect the watch, we perceive (what we could not discover in the stone) that its several parts are framed and put together for a purpose, e.g. that they are so formed and adjusted as to produce motion, and that motion so regulated as to point out the hour of the day; that, if the several parts had been differently shaped from what they are, of a different size from what they are, or placed after any other manner, or in any other order, than that in which they are placed, either no motion at all would have been carried on in the machine, or none which would have answered the use, that is now served by it. To reckon up a few of the plainest of these parts, and of their offices, all tending to one result:––We see a cylindrical box containing a coiled elastic spring, which, by its endeavour to relax itself, turns round the box. We next observe a flexible chain (artificially wrought for the sake of flexure) communicating the action of the spring from the box to the fusee. We then find a series of wheels, the teeth of which catch in, and apply to, each other, conducting the motion from the fusee to the balance, and from the balance to the pointer; and at the same time, by the size and shape of those wheels, so regulating that motion, as to terminate in causing an index, by an equable and measured progression, to pass over a given space in a given time. We take notice that the wheels are made of brass, in order to keep them from rust; the springs of steel, no other metal being so elastic; that over the face of the watch there is placed a glass, a material employed in no other part of the work, but, in the room of which, if there had been any other than a transparent substance, the hour could not be seen without opening the case. This mechanism being observed (it requires indeed an examination of the instrument, and perhaps some previous knowledge of the subject, to perceive and understand it; but being once, as we have said, observed and understood), the inference, we think, is inevitable; that the watch must have had a maker; that there must have existed, at some time and at some place or other, an artificer or artificers who formed it for the purpose which we find it actually to answer; who comprehended its construction, and designed its use. (Natural Theology, Chapter 1).

Paley goes on to make further comparisons between natural biological structures and artificial machines, arguing that biological machines are even more incredible than anything designed by human beings, building upon the argument until it seems ridiculous to suggest that such complex biological structures could be anything other than the products of a designer. The passage above is the beginning of one of the most intuitively persuasive arguments ever written, I think. But is this argument’s persuasiveness more than just intuitive? Most modern biologists say no: Darwin’s theory of evolution killed the biological design argument dead. Real dead. Deader than a coffin nail. That kind of dead.

Richard Dawkins has written several books supporting the thesis that Paley is dead…or whatever. He is absolutely confident that Darwinism is true and that Paleyism (?) is false. In fact, he even thinks he has a knock-down argument against the design argument, which he entitles the “Ultimate Boeing 747” argument (p. 113). I’ve already refuted that argument in a previous post, and quoted numerous serious criticisms of Dawkins’ argument in another, so it would be redundant to repeat all that here. If you haven’t read those posts, I suggest you go back and read them now. I have also pointed out what I consider to be the main difficulty with using the biological design argument to reason to the existence of God.

Having already discussed certain aspects of Dawkins’ critique of design arguments, I’ll focus here primarily on what Dawkins fails to do in The God Delusion. Most of the early discussion of this argument is uselessly taken up with attempting to compare what Dawkins is doing in The God Delusion, to feminist ‘raising awareness’, a useless analogy, as it does not advance the argument at all, but merely presupposes that atheists have already won the argument and must now move on to political propaganda. This section does, however, show just how politically-minded this book really is. Dawkins’ real agenda is not to reason his way carefully through the issues, but to ‘raise awareness’, which is left-wing political lingua for pushing a particular political agenda. Of course, the worthiness of that particular political agenda depends on its content, and, more specifically, the validity of its arguments. So far, Dawkins has failed to show why his own agenda is worthy of anything.

After this, Dawkins quotes approvingly Douglas Adams’ citing Dawkins’ own books – approvingly, of course. This is followed by a brief spell of humility, in which Dawkins gives an appreciative nod to Charles Darwin, and then another nod to Douglas Adams and then a third nod to his friend and fellow new atheist Daniel Dennett. Once the first wave of collegial back-slapping is done, we have another reference to awareness-raising. Then further collegial back-slapping ensues, as Dawkins comments approvingly on the opinions of his fellow new atheists, Victor Stenger and Peter Atkins; then, finally, he gives the last word to that great scientist and philosopher, Woody Allen. Through all this there is zero engagement with the arguments for design by contemporary Intelligent Design advocates and almost no attempt at presenting any argument at all. Dawkins has successfully wasted six pages (pp. 113-8) that could have been used more productively, or else omitted altogether, to make the book more economical. I mention this only to show how much of Dawkins book is fluff. The real substance of the book could probably be condensed into less than two-hundred pages. That estimate includes the notes, recommended books, index and appendix – roughly thirty pages in all.

Dawkins starts his discussion of ‘irreducible complexity’ by talking about a book published in 1985 by the Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, some 336 pages. This is an odd way to start one’s discussion of this concept as the term was actually coined by biochemist Prof. Michael J. Behe in book Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (Free Press, 1996; rev. ed. 2007), more than ten years after the JWs’ book was published. Why not quote directly from Behe’s own writings? Why spend several pages refuting a book that has nothing to do with the Intelligent Design movement? Surely if Dawkins expects to refute the best version of the argument, he should critique the arguments of the scientist who is the leading expert on them. Dawkins mentions Behe, referring to him inaccurately as a ‘creationist’, and accusing him of a ‘worship of the gaps’. He makes the further accusation that Behe, and those like him, are only making an ‘argument from personal incredulity’, i.e., ‘I can’t understand how it happened, so God must have done it!’

To all this I say: Bullshit. Anyone who has read Behe’s book, and his second work The Edge of Evolution: Searching for the Limits of Darwinism (Free Press, 2007), will be aware that Dawkins’ caricature of Behe is not just exaggeration or misinterpretation – it is outright lies. It may be that Behe’s argument is wrong. That’s always possible. But Dawkins’ ‘refutation’ is nothing but a refusal to engage with the real arguments. Again, this should not surprise anyone who has stuck with me this far. After briefly describing the structure of the bacterial flagellum, which is one of Behe’s most famous examples of irreducible complexity, Dawkins continues:

Without a word of justification, explanation or amplification, Behe simply proclaims the bacterial flagellar motor to be irreducibly complex. Since he offers no argument in favour of his assertion, we may begin by suspecting a failure of his imagination (p. 131).

More lies. Behe actually gives a detailed argument as to why the neo-Darwinian mechanism cannot provide an adequate explanation of the bacterial flagellar motor. Dawkins simply proclaims that he has not done so, because it is easier to say that than to attempt to refute Behe. Here Dawkins’ sloppy scholarship and intellectual dishonesty meet in outright lies. Instead of refuting Behe himself – which would have taken at least some effort – Dawkins decides to defer to the opinion of an 'expert': John E. Jones, the judge at the now-famous Dover Trial in the U.S. The fact that his ‘expert’ (1) is not a biochemist, (2) showed a manifest bias throughout the proceedings and (3) made numerous provably false claims in his judgement at the end of the trial – worse still, that had actually been proven to be false during the trial – again shows that Dawkins is not interested in rational argument or in getting to the truth. Exactly what does the opinion of a district judge have to do with scientific debate? If Jones had found in his Opinion that Intelligent Design is a brilliant scientific theory, would Dawkins have accepted that? No, he would not, and the debate over ID would have continued. So, why does he think that citing Judge Jones somehow ends the debate for good? In fact, why does he think that citing the opinion of Judge Jones matters at all? In fact, why does he think that the mere opinion of any individual matters at all? What should matter are the arguments.

But, before we move on to the argument, there is one more point I would like to make about Dawkins’ commentary of the Dover Trial. Dawkins refers approvingly to the opposing attorney’s attempt to undermine Behe’s testimony: “Behe, under cross-examination by Eric Rothschild, chief counsel for the plaintiffs, was forced to admit that he hadn't read most of those fifty-eight peer-reviewed papers” (p. 133). This is an old lawyer trick used to undermine the testimony of an expert witness: hand him/her a large stack of technical papers – the larger the better to impress people who are impressed by that kind of thing – and demand that he/she refute them all on the stand. If the expert can’t do so, the lawyer implies that their testimony can be dismissed as invalid. The fact that Dawkins falls for this sand-bagging tactic demonstrates just how much he would rather the Dover Trial were the end of the debate. However, even Dawkins admits that it would be difficult: “Hardly surprising, for immunology is hard work” (p. 133). Indeed, which is why Dawkins would rather quote lawyers and judges than work out the details himself.

Commenting on Behe’s response to Rothschild, Dawkins states: “Less forgivable is that Behe dismissed such research as 'unfruitful'. It certainly is unfruitful if your aim is to make propaganda among gullible laypeople and politicians, rather than to discover important truths about the real world” (p. 133). However, Behe himself explained his reasons for rejecting the research cited by Rothschild. The quote below includes an excerpt from Jones’ own Opinion, in bold, followed by Behe’s response:

(11) In fact, on cross-examination, Professor Behe was questioned concerning his 1996 claim that science would never find an evolutionary explanation for the immune system. He was presented with fifty eight peer-reviewed publications, nine books, and several immunology textbook chapters about the evolution of the immune system; however, he simply insisted that this was still not sufficient evidence of evolution, and that it was not “good enough.” (23:19

(Behe)).

Several points:

1) Although the opinion’s phrasing makes it seem to come from my mouth, the remark about the studies being “not good enough” was the cross-examining attorney’s, not mine.

2) I was given no chance to read them, and at the time considered the dumping of a stack of papers and books on the witness stand to be just a stunt, simply bad courtroom theater. Yet the Court treats it seriously.

3) The Court here speaks of “evidence for evolution”. Throughout the trial I carefully distinguished between the various meanings of the word “evolution”, and I made it abundantly clear that I was challenging Darwin’s proposed mechanism of random mutation coupled to natural selection. Unfortunately, the Court here, as in many other places in its opinion, ignores the distinction between evolution and Darwinism.

I said in my testimony that the studies may have been fine as far as they went, but that they certainly did not present detailed, rigorous explanations for the evolution of the immune system by random mutation and natural selection — if they had, that knowledge would be reflected in more recent studies that I had had a chance to read (see below). [emphasis added]

4) This is the most blatant example of the Court’s simply accepting the Plaintiffs’ say-so on the state of the science and disregarding the opinions of the defendants’ experts. I strongly suspect the Court did not itself read the “fifty eight peer-reviewed publications, nine books, and several immunology textbook chapters about the evolution of the immune system” and determine from its own expertise that they demonstrated Darwinian claims. How can the Court declare that a stack of publications shows anything at all if the defense expert disputes it and the Court has not itself read and understood them? [emphasis added]

In my own direct testimony I went through the papers referenced by Professor Miller in his testimony and showed they didn’t even contain the phrase “random mutation”; that is, they assumed Darwinian evolution by random mutation and natural selection was true — they did not even try to demonstrate it. [emphasis added] I further showed in particular that several very recent immunology papers cited by Miller were highly speculative, in other words, that there is no current rigorous Darwinian explanation for the immune system. The Court does not mention this testimony. (Whether Intelligent Design is Science: A Response to the Opinion of the Court in Kitzmiller vs. Dover Area School District, 2006, pp. 6-7).

Behe rebuts numerous other distortions in Jones’ Opinion in this online article. I would strongly recommend that the reader go through Behe’s response in detail.

Considering the inaccuracy of Dawkins’ account of the Dover Trial, it would be appropriate to use his own words against him: “if your aim is to make propaganda among gullible laypeople and politicians, rather than to discover important truths about the real world” then (1) quoting biased lawyers’ and judges’ opinions as decisive refutations of scientific arguments, (2) distorting history, and (3) failing to carefully examine the issues in your own ‘refutation’, would be a good way to go about it.

Lest I be accused of suggesting that Dawkins says nothing about the specifics of Behe’s arguments, I should point out that he does attempt to discuss them, briefly, after already having declared them worthless, based on the opinions of Jones and Rothschild. However, his discussion involves several distortions and/or misunderstandings of Behe’s argument. Firstly, Dawkins gives a brief attempt at summarising the logic behind the irreducible complexity arument: “The key to demonstrating irreducible complexity is to show that none of the parts could have been useful on its own” (p. 131). Actually, that is incorrect. The irreducible complexity argument is summarised accurately by Behe himself:

The main difficulty for Darwinian mechanisms is that many systems in the cell are what I termed “irreducibly complex.” I defined an irreducibly complex system as: a single system that is necessarily composed of several well-matched, interacting parts that contribute to the basic function, and where the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning…As an example from everyday life of an irreducibly complex system, I pointed to a mechanical mousetrap such as one finds in a hardware store. Typically, such traps have a number of parts: a spring, a wooden platform, a hammer, and other pieces. If one removes a piece from the trap, it can’t catch mice. Without the spring, or hammer, or any of the other pieces, one doesn’t have a trap that works half as well as it used to, or a quarter as well; one has a broken mousetrap, which doesn’t work at all (‘Irreducible Complexity: Obstacle to Darwinian Evolution’ in Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA, Cambridge University Press, 2004, p. 353).

Note that the irreducible structure of a complex system has nothing to do with whether the individual parts might have some function on their own or might have some function in another part of the organism. What is actually at issue, Dawkins (again!) fails to understand, is the ability of the neo-Darwinian mechanism to assemble this collection of parts by a gradual step-by-step process into a complex machine in which all the parts are essential to its function, so that all the parts fit together in a way that provides function. Behe goes to considerable length in his writings to show that (1) the biochemical machines he uses as examples almost certainly cannot have been put together gradually and that (2) all the parts truly are essential to the function of the machine. If he can establish these two claims with a reasonable degree of certainty, then his argument is a strong one and deserves to be taken seriously.

Secondly, Dawkins goes on to summarise an argument from molecular biologist Kenneth Miller, whose book, Finding Darwin’s God, Dawkins recommends for its critique of Behe's discussion of the flagellar motor:

The protein molecules that form the structure of the TTSS [Type Three Secretory System] are very similar to components of the flagellar motor. To the evolutionist it is clear that TTSS components were commandeered for a new, but not wholly unrelated, function when the flagellar motor evolved. Given that the TTSS is tugging molecules through itself, it is not surprising that it uses a rudimentary version of the principle used by the flagellar motor, which tugs the molecules of the axle round and round. Evidently, crucial components of the flagellar motor were already in place and working before the flagellar motor evolved. Commandeering existing mechanisms is an obvious way in which an apparently irreducibly complex piece of apparatus could climb Mount Improbable (p. 132).

Here Dawkins’ earlier error comes into play: He assumes that because biochemists have found a system with parts similar to the bacterial flagella motor, this refutes the argument. Actually, it doesn’t. Firstly, as I have already pointed out, it is the arrangement of the parts that is irreducibly complex and Dawkins needs to show how these parts could be cumulatively selected for to form the flagella motor. To simply point out that similar parts exist in other biochemical systems does nothing to address this issue. Secondly, Dawkins (predictably) fails to acknowledge that Behe had already responded to Miller’s arguments several years before The God Delusion was published. So, either Dawkins had failed to keep up with the debate, or he chose to ignore Behe’s counter-arguments. Sloppy. But it ain’t nothin’ new from the Oxford don.

Behe discusses the errors inherent in such attempts to refute ‘irreducible complexity’:

Consider a hypothetical example where proteins homologous to all of the parts of an irreducibly complex molecular machine first had other individual functions in the cell. Might the irreducible system then have been put together from individual components that originally worked on their own, as some Darwinists have proposed? Unfortunately, this picture greatly oversimplifies the difficulty, as I discussed in Darwin’s Black Box. Here analogies to mousetraps break down somewhat, because the parts of a molecular system have to find each other automatically in the cell. They can’t be arranged by an intelligent agent, as a mousetrap is. In order to find each other in the cell, interacting parts have to have their surfaces shaped so that they are very closely matched to each other…Originally, however, the individually acting components would not have had complementary surfaces. So all of the interacting surfaces of all of the components would first have to be adjusted before they could function together. And only then would the new function of the composite system appear. Thus, I emphasize strongly, the problem of irreducibility remains, even if individual proteins homologous to system components separately and originally had their own functions (‘Irreducible Complexity’ article, p. 358-9).

He further explains Miller’s precise errors in his argument against the irreducibility of the bacterial flagellum:

In recent years, it has been shown that the bacterial flagellum is an even more sophisticated system than had been thought. Not only does it act as a rotary propulsion device, it also contains within itself an elegant mechanism used to transport the proteins that make up the outer portion of the machine from the inside of the cell to the outside. Without blinking, Miller asserted that the flagellum is not irreducibly complex because some proteins of the flagellum could be missing and the remainder could still transport proteins, perhaps independently. (Proteins similar – but not identical – to some found in the flagellum occur in the type III secretory system of some bacteria.) Again, he was equivocating, switching the focus from the function of the system, acting as a rotary propulsion machine, to the ability of a subset of the system to transport proteins across a membrane.

However, taking away the parts of the flagellum certainly destroys the ability of the system to act as a rotary propulsion machine, as I have argued. Thus, contra Miller, the flagellum is indeed irreducibly complex. What’s more, the function of transporting proteins has as little directly to do with the function of rotary propulsion as a toothpick has to do with a mousetrap. So discovering the supportive function of transporting proteins tells us precisely nothing about how Darwinian processes might have put together a rotary propulsion machine. (‘Irreducible Complexity’ article, p. 360).

Finally, Dawkins wraps up his argument by quoting Judges Jones again and then accusing Behe, again, of arguing from ignorance. By this point, the irony ought to be obvious. I think the reader should read Behe’s own response to Jones’ claims, and assess for themselves the fairness of Jones’ claims. Behe has also responded to other criticisms of his work in an article entitled ‘Answering Scientific Criticisms of Intelligent Design’ in Science and Evidence of Design in Nature (Ignatius Press, 2000). I would also recommend that readers study Behe's book Darwin's Black Box, for, although Behe has further clarified his argument and defended it from criticism in various articles, his book remains the best discussion of the argument.

Dawkins’ discussion of the irreducible complexity argument is one of the low points of his book. Not that there have been many high points, so far. Again and again, Dawkins fails to address the real arguments of his chosen opponents. His favourite method of ‘rebuttal’ is to simply distort or misinterpret the real argument and then refute the distorted argument, instead. If the distortion is conscious, then Dawkins is guilty, over and over, of intellectual dishonesty. If the distortion is accidental, then it is because Dawkins has failed, over and over, to do the necessary research to properly analyse the arguments.

One final point about Intelligent Design arguments before I move on: Dawkins' failure to properly address Behe’s argument is bad enough, but the total absence of any discussion of Stephen C. Meyer and William A. Dembski’s defences of the argument from ‘specified complexity’, specifically the ‘information argument’, is inexcusable. While the best defences of this argument – Meyer’s books Signature in the Cell: DNA and the Evidence for Intelligent Design (HarperOne, 2009) and Darwin’s Doubt: The Explosive Origin of Animal Life and the Case for Intelligent Design (HarperOne, 2013) – only came out after The God Delusion was published, Meyer published several papers defending the argument before Dawkins’ book was published. This included a widely-publicized article entitled ‘The Origin of Biological Information and the Higher Taxonomic Categories’, Proceedings of the Biological Society of Washington (August 4, 2004). He also defended the information argument in relation to the origin of life in “DNA and the origin of life: information, specification and explanation” in J. A. Campbell and S. C. Meyer, eds., Darwinism, design and public education (Michigan State University Press, 2003), pp. 223-285. Why do Dawkins’ readers get no hint of these arguments in The God Delusion? This is not a minor argument. In fact, this could be said to be the central argument for Intelligent Design in biology! Yes, even more important than Behe’s ‘irreducible complexity’ argument. Still, perhaps it was for the best that Dawkins didn’t discuss this argument, considering his track record so far.