Contra Dawkins, Part 9

Part IX: Monkeying with Physics

Robin Collins, probably the foremost defender the fine-tuning argument today, lists several examples of fine-tuning:

1. If the initial explosion of the big bang had differed in strength by as little as 1 part in 1060, the universe would have either quickly collapsed back on itself, or expanded too rapidly for stars to form. In either case, life would be impossible…(As John Jefferson Davis points out, an accuracy of one part in 10^60 can be compared to firing a bullet at a one-inch target on the other side of the observable universe, twenty billion light years away, and hitting the target.)

2. Calculations indicate that if the strong nuclear force, the force that binds protons and neutrons together in an atom, had been stronger or weaker by as little as 5%, life would be impossible…

3. Calculations by Brandon Carter show that if gravity had been stronger or weaker by 1 part in 10 to the 40th power, then life-sustaining stars like the sun could not exist. This would most likely make life impossible…

4. If the neutron were not about 1.001 times the mass of the proton, all protons would have decayed into neutrons or all neutrons would have decayed into protons, and thus life would not be possible…

5. If the electromagnetic force were slightly stronger or weaker, life would be impossible, for a variety of different reasons…

 

Imaginatively, one could think of each instance of fine-tuning as a radio dial: unless all the dials are set exactly right, life would be impossible. Or, one could think of the initial conditions of the universe and the fundamental parameters of physics as a dart board that fills the whole galaxy, and the conditions necessary for life to exist as a small one-foot wide target: unless the dart hits the target, life would be impossible. The fact that the dials are perfectly set, or the dart has hit the target, strongly suggests that someone set the dials or aimed the dart, for it seems enormously improbable that such a coincidence could have happened by chance.

Although individual calculations of fine-tuning are only approximate and could be in error, the fact that the universe is fine-tuned for life is almost beyond question because of the large number of independent instances of apparent fine-tuning. As philosopher John Leslie has pointed out, "clues heaped upon clues can constitute weighty evidence despite doubts about each element in the pile".

 

End Quote. Dawkins briefly discusses these examples, as well, citing Martin Rees popular work Just Six Numbers (pp. 141-3) So the reality of fine-tuning is pretty much undeniable - although this does not stop some atheists from denying it. New Atheist Victor Stenger, in particular, has written a lengthy attack on the reality of fine-tuning in physics titled The Fallacy of Fine Tuning. Critiques of Stenger's argument have been written by Collins (see here) and Australian astronomer Luke Barnes (in a technical article and a couple of popular-level blog posts - here and here). As Dawkins accepts fine-tuning to be real (p. 141), and so do I, I'll let readers study this exchange for themselves, and focus on Dawkins' discussion of the argument.

William Lane Craig helpfully summarises the fine-tuning argument as follows: 

1. The fine-tuning of the universe is due to either physical necessity, chance, or design.

2. It is not due to physical necessity or chance.

3. Therefore, it is due to design.

While Craig summarises the argument as a deductive syllogism, other proponents of the argument prefer abductive or inductive approaches to defending the argument. Collins clearly prefers an abductive or probabilistic approach to a deductive one, and Collins' approach is preferable, I think. Nevertheless, Craig's summary is valuable as it lays out all the options available pretty succinctly. Obviously, the second premise is the most controversial. The first premise simply states the options open to us once we accept the reality of fine-tuning. By 'physical necessity', Craig means the idea that the fundamental constants of physics could not have been otherwise. This idea has been proposed by some physicists, but is not widely accepted, for two reasons:

1. There is no reason, based on the current understanding of physics, to accept that the constants should be determined, and some good reasons to accept that they are not so. So proposing that they must be so remains a mere assertion, at best.

2. Appealing to 'physical necessity' only begs the further question of why the fundamental constants had to be fine-tuned in just this way. That is, unless you could ground physical necessity in the more fundamental levels of metaphysical or logical necessity, the question of why physical reality had to be this way remains unanswered. As a metaphysical alternative to design, physical necessity is, therefore, inadequate, for it does not actually present an alternative, but merely asserts 'that's the way it is, and that's all'. This is obviously not adequate.

So, physical determinism is not a good alternative to design. Dawkins agrees, again citing the opinion of Martin Rees (pp. 144-5). But what of other alternatives? Dawkins, as he did with fine-tuning in astronomy, appeals to the 'anthropic explanation'. The anthropic explanation goes like this: 'Well, obviously we live in a universe that is friendly to life, or else we would not be here to discover that fact! This really should not be that surprising.' The problem with this response is that it fails to explain why there is fine-tuning. Instead, it only explains why we should not be surprised to find that we live in a universe friendly to life. So, how does Dawkins respond to the problem of fine-tuning?

His first response is to repeat his fallacious 'Ultimate Boeing 747' argument, which I have responded to elsewhere (see here and here). This does, indeed, appear to be Dawkins' 'go-to' argument when presented with a serious challenge. It's almost like he thinks it's his 'Get-Out-of-Jail-Free' card. The ultimate riposte. Following this, after some speculation as to why, from the somewhat dubious perspective of evolutionary psychology, people might be inclined to see the action of agents where there is none, Dawkins states his own position:

  "Biologists, with their raised consciousness of the power of natural selection to explain the rise of improbable things, are unlikely to be satisfied with any theory that evades the problem of improbability altogether. And the theistic response to the riddle of improbability is an evasion of stupendous proportions. It is more than a restatement of the problem, it is a grotesque amplification of it. Let's turn, then, to the anthropic alternative. The anthropic answer, in its most general form, is that we could only be discussing the question in the kind of universe that was capable of producing us. Our existence therefore determines that the fundamental constants of physics had to be in their respective Goldilocks zones. Different physicists espouse different kinds of anthropic solutions to the riddle of our existence" (p. 144).

This is the essence of Dawkins counter-argument. Craig outlines Dawkins' argument:

1. One of the greatest challenges to the human intellect has been to explain
how the complex, improbable appearance of design in the universe arises.

2. The natural temptation is to attribute the appearance of design to actual
design itself.

3. The temptation is a false one because the designer hypothesis immediately
raises the larger problem of who designed the designer.

4. The most ingenious and powerful explanation is Darwinian evolution by
natural selection.

5. We don’t have an equivalent explanation for physics.

6. We should not give up the hope of a better explanation arising in physics,
something as powerful as Darwinism is for biology.

Therefore, God almost certainly does not exist.

The first two premises are not contentious. The third premise, based on Dawkins' 'Ultimate Boeing 747' argument, is - as I have shown in previous posts listed above - false. Premise four assumes the validity of neo-Darwinism, a topic we covered in a earlier post in this series. Premise five states the obvious, and premise six is highly dubious, as there is no connection between biology and physics, such that we should expect that an explanation analogous to that of Darwinism could even be possible for physics. So, even assuming the validity of Darwinism, Dawkins' argument is incredibly weak. In fact, his argument seems to be based on no more that an irrational appeal to the supposed complexity of God and the presumption of naturalism. For it is only if we assume naturalism that we are committed to something like a Darwinian explanation of the fine-tuning of physics. 

Furthermore, the conclusion does not actually follow from the premises. Even if physicists could provide an adequate physical explanation for the fine-tuning of physics, this would not disprove the existence of God, nor make God's existence less probable. What it would mean is that theists could not use fine-tuning specifically as evidence of God's existence. It would not refute other arguments; and, as I have noted previously, there are other, I believe better, arguments for God's existence than design arguments from physics and biology.

In response to the objections, raised above, against the 'anthropic explanation', that it fails to explain why the universe is fine-tuned, Dawkins appeals to the idea of a multiverse:

"The laws and constants of any one universe, such as our observable universe, are by-laws. The multiverse as a whole has a plethora of alternative sets of by-laws. The anthropic principle kicks in to explain that we have to be in one of those universes (presumably a minority) whose by-laws happened to be propitious to our eventual evolution and hence contemplation of the problem" (p. 145).

Dawkins then goes on to discuss several mutually-exclusive versions of the multiverse concept such as the oscillating universe and Lee Smolin's idea of universes 'giving birth' to 'mutated' universes and, thus, 'evolving'. The fact that such fundamentally different versions of the multiverse could be equally 'plausible' should send of alarm bells for Dawkins' readers. Where is the empirical data by which we might construct an accurate model of the multiverse? Answer: There is none. All this is pure speculation. 

Furthermore, it is highly implausible speculation. Robin Collins has written extensively on the multiverse idea, and has shown that it does not even explain the existence of fine-tuning, as each of the multiverse models proposed require a high level of fine-tuning themselves, in order to be even hypothetically plausible (see here and here for details). If this is the case, then the multiverse does not explain fine-tuning, but simply pushes it up a level: from the fine-tuning of the universe to the fine-tuning of the multiverse. In which case, fine-tuning would still need to be explained. However, the atheist would be bereft of his/her only possible alternatives to design. So, either the atheist must accept design, as the only explanation left, or stubbornly maintain their opposition to design and ultimately deny that there is an explanation. To do so, however, would be to admit that atheism is ultimately irrational: it cannot provide rational explanations of the most fundamental features of the physical universe.

Dawkins does not seem to be aware of Collin's critiques of the multiverse; or, if he is, he chooses to ignore them. He does, however, attempt to address a different objection:

"The multiverse, for all that it is extravagant, is simple. God, or any intelligent, decision-taking, calculating agent, would have to be highly improbable in the very same statistical sense as the entities he is supposed to explain. The multiverse may seem extravagant in sheer number of universes. But if each one of those universes is simple in its fundamental laws, we are still not postulating anything highly improbable. The very opposite has to be said of any kind of intelligence" (p. 147).

Again, Dawkins falls back upon his 'complex God' objection. The number of times that he repeats this argument throughout his book shows how much he depends upon it as a fall-back position. However, he never really attempts to defend this argument - or even outline or explain it properly. He merely asserts that any entity that is intelligent enough to create the universe must be complex. The obvious response is: Why? Dawkins doesn't say. And this is the central argument in his book against God: the one he continually falls back upon when his other arguments are weak! As mathematician and philosopher David Berlinski writes:

"At times, Dawkins asserts that God is an irrelevance because He has been assigned the task of constructing a universe that is improbable. If the universe is improbable, “it is obviously no solution to postulate something even more improbable.” Why an improbable universe demands an improbable
God, Dawkins does not say and I do not know" (The Devil's Delusion: Atheism and Its Scientific Pretensions, p. 142).

The basic problem with Dawkins' contention that the multiverse would, in fact, be less complex that his (faulty) idea of God, is that his appeal to 'simple' fundamental laws is erroneous. As noted above, Collins has already shown that, in fact, the multiverse would itself have to be fine-tuned. Notably, Dawkins doesn't elaborate on his proposed 'simple' laws, but merely asserts their existence. Again, Dawkins seems to be in the habit assuming his own worldview as a premise in his arguments. He seems to be assuming that, because the complexity of the hypothetical multiverse must be explained, and because God is not an option within a naturalistic worldview, then the complexity must ultimately be grounded in simple laws. But he fails to provide the very thing he constantly accuses theists of failing to provide: evidence. It would seem that Dawkins can propose ideas, without evidence, and that's OK; but theists doing the same thing is unforgivable irrationality.

The rest of Dawkins' discussion on this subject is devoted to ridiculing theist physicists John Polkinghorne and Russell Stannard and philosopher (not a theologian, as Dawkins labels him) Richard Swinburne, apparently because he feels the need to recognise their existence, but not the need to treat their arguments fairly. Throughout this section of his book Dawkins doesn't even try to keep the condescension out of his tone. Oddly, it would seem that Dawkins dislikes most intensely those who are actually attempting to meet that challenge that he raises continually throughout his writings: to present serious arguments for the existence of God.

Dawkins writes:

"Predictably, they seize upon the improbability of the physical constants all being tuned in their more or less narrow Goldilocks zones, and suggest that there must be a cosmic intelligence who deliberately did the tuning. I have already dismissed all such suggestions as raising bigger problems than they solve. But what attempts have theists made to reply?" (p. 147).

If he has already dismissed their arguments, why does he bother mentioning them? And why didn't he discuss their arguments - with relevant quotations - in the context of his previous discussion, rather than as a tack-on? His comment about how 'predictably' Stannard and Polkinghorne 'seize upon' this argument is also telling of Dawkins' attitude. Like he's rolling his eyes as he writes this. But, of course, this mean nothing. One could equally-well say something like:

"Predictably, atheists like Richard Dawkins and Jerry Coyne seize upon the Darwinian idea of natural selection plus random variation and suggest that this must disprove the biological design argument..."

Adopting this long-suffering tone, Dawkins tries to give the impression that Polkinghorne, Stannard and Swinburne's views are a waste of time, when, in fact, each of these individuals have given far greater, and more in-depth analysis of these and other issues than Dawkins gives evidence of doing.

Finally, Dawkins asks, rhetorically, 'But what attempts have theists made to reply?' Good question. Unfortunately, when it comes to dealing with theists' responses, Dawkins seems little interested in the substance of the responses. As ever, Dawkins seeks to imply that the sloppiness and shallowness of thought is on the side of the theist, when, in reality, theists have addressed each and every one of his arguments and objections in-depth. Dawkins has just not bothered to carefully consider their answers. Dawkins' theological and philosophical ineptitude is his impregnable shield. So long as he doesn't know what theists' arguments actually are - so long as he doesn't make to effort to understand them properly - he can pretend that they are worthless.

For example, Dawkins criticises Swinburne's argument for God's simplicity, summarised briefly in Is There a God? (p. 147-8). Personally, I don't find Swinburne's discussion of Divine simplicity to be very compelling, relative to older discussions of the subject from classical theists - though Swinburne's arguments are far more plausible than Dawkins' arguments. I have already shown the worthlessness of Dawkins' discussion of the 'Ultimate Boeing 747' argument. For a fuller discussion of this subject, written from the perspective of classical theism, see here and here.

One of the basic problems with Dawkins' discussion of the supposed complexity of God in the rest of this chapter is that Dawkins is using the idea of complexity in quite a different sense to that of Swinburne, Keith Ward and others he criticises. They are using the term 'simple' in the sense of 'a simple explanation', i.e., a more parsimonious explanation - one that does not multiply explanatory hypotheses beyond necessity. Or, as Ockham put it, pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate: 'plurality should not be posited without necessity'. It is for this reason that many theist critics of the multiverse idea would argue that God is a simpler explanation than the multiverse: because the multiverse idea postulates the existence of a potentially infinite number of unobservable 'other universes', whereas theism postulates only one God. 

Dawkins, by contrast, is using the term in the sense of 'physically complex'. He makes this clear when he continually draws analogies to physically complex objects like Boeing 747s, brains, eyes, etc, in an attempt to refute design arguments. He then attacks these theistic philosophers' arguments for God as a 'simple hypothesis', apparently not realising (or just not caring) that they are using the term 'simple' in a different sense.  He even accuses them of not understanding what it means for something to be a 'simple explanation'!

The simple fact is that God cannot be complex in the sense that Dawkins means - whether or not one talks about 'divine simplicity' in the way it is used by Swinburne and Ward or by classical theists like Aquinas or Maimonides. God is immaterial (i.e., non-physical) being. The kind of complexity Dawkins is talking about is physical complexity. Therefore, God cannot be complex in the sense that Dawkins means. Consequently, either Dawkins needs to seriously re-think his argument, or give it up altogether. So long as he continues repeating his argument as-is, the only thing that will impress theists about his argument is how dumb it is. Indeed, philosopher William Lane Craig has suggested that it is probably the worst argument against God ever published. I haven't read as widely in atheist literature as Dr. Craig has, but from my experience, it certainly belongs in the top five.

The rest of Dawkins' discussion focuses on repeating his 'complex God' assertion in reply to various arguments from theists (Richard Swinburne and a group of unnamed theologians at Cambridge). As I've already pointed out the many errors in this argument - plus the fact that repeating the same argument over and over, as Dawkins does, doesn't make it any less irrational - I'll ignore the rest of his discussion and end my critique here. I'll finish my discussion of Chapters 3-4 of Dawkins' book in a final post, summarising the criticisms I've made throughout this critique.