God, Darwin, and How Not to Argue Against God

Some time ago I briefly skimmed an essay in the New York Times by psychologist and evolutionary biologist David Barash entitled 'God, Darwin and My College Biology Class'. What struck me about this essay at the time was the brazen way in which Barash admits to proselytizing for atheism in his biology classes. In the very first paragraph of the essay, Barash bluntly states: "Every year around this time, with the college year starting, I give my students The Talk. It isn’t, as you might expect, about sex, but about evolution and religion, and how they get along. More to the point, how they don’t." How would an atheist like Barash react if a theist physics professor were to write something like: "Every year around this time, I give my students The Talk - about the laws of nature and atheism, how they get along. More to the point, how they don't." If the theist physicist were then to go on the note that he spent the entirety of The Talk insisting that you cannot be a physicist and an atheist without engaging in some highly convoluted mental gymnastics - or else giving up trying to reconcile them at all, no doubt Dr. Barash would regard such rhetoric as just that - rhetoric, not reason. And yet, several of the greatest physicists of modern times - Sir Isaac Newton, Johannes Kepler, James Clark Maxwell and Albert Einstein, among others - were convinced that you could not explain the existence of order, or 'law', in nature apart from the existence of a Divine Intellect.

Alternatively, of course, you could cite the names of some of the most influential evolutionary biologists of recent times insisting that it is impossible to reconcile the idea of God with Darwinian evolution. Darwin himself doubted it could be done. Thomas Huxley believed the same; so did Ernst Haeckel, except Haeckel's antagonism toward God was even more explicit. More recently, Julian Huxley, John Maynard Smith, Richard Dawkins, Jerry Coyne, and numerous others would agree. Obviously, both groups cannot be right. I have commented already on how I find the argument from order to be compelling. So, lets take a look at Barash's arguments, to see what he has to say in defence of his conclusions. His comments are, I should say, typical of the kind of reasoning you might find in the writings of the other atheists and agnostics listed above.

"I’m a biologist, in fact an evolutionary biologist, although no biologist, and no biology course, can help being “evolutionary.” My animal behavior class, with 200 undergraduates, is built on a scaffolding of evolutionary biology."

The claim that is is impossible to be a biologist without being, at least implicitly, an evolutionist, is an extension of the popular claim that 'nothing is biology makes sense, except in the light of evolution'. This claim is, I think, obviously untrue for a couple of reasons.

Firstly, biology existed before Darwin. Some Darwinists will go so far as to imply that 'true' biology didn't really begin until Darwin, but this is clearly false. Many facts about biology were well-known prior to Darwin, and these facts were not obscured in any way by an absence of Darwinian ideas. One might argue in response that huge advances in biology have occurred since Darwin. This is true, but it's also largely irrelevant. This advances have not been due to Darwinian theory, but to significant advances in technology, e.g. the microscope, X-ray, MRI, etc. These advances in technology developed independently of the rise of Darwinian thought, and it seems extremely dubious to suggest that these advances would not have been made without Darwin. 

The truth is that the only area of biology were Darwinian thought is essential for biologists is biological origins, and that is only because biologists insist on a purely naturalistic/mechanistic account of the origins and development of life. As I have pointed out before, if you assume evolutionary naturalism, then something like Darwinian theory must be true, but that cannot be an argument for evolutionary naturalism, because it pre-supposes the truth of evolutionary naturalism.

Secondly, genuine advances in biology progress independently of evolutionary explanation. What typically happens, is that a biologist will make a new discovery, and then, after the facts have been established, those fact will be interpreted within a Darwinian framework. The actual discovery of those facts, however are not dependent on the truth of such a Darwinian framework. For example, we can understand how the human heart works without any appeal to Darwinian theory. In fact, Darwinian interpretation must pre-suppose that we already know a lot about the form and function of a particular biological structure, because we must understand its function in order to understand how it might provide a selective advantage to the organism.

As an argument for the validity of Darwinian theory, the 'nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution' assertion is poor, precisely because it implicitly pre-spposes the validity of Darwinian theory. First scientists dicovery new facts about biology. Then Darwinists interpret those facts within a Darwinian framework. After that, a new generation of biologists are taught that these biological facts within a Darwinian context. 

By the end of this process, the new generation are convinced that you cannot understand these facts outside this Darwinian context - not because this is true, but because they have been taught to think a certain way, and (most) lack the skills, opportunity or motivation necessary to look at the facts independently of the theory, and ask, 'Is it possible to understand these facts within a different framework?' Once you begin to question the framework, you rapidly realise that the facts can be interpreted in a variety of different ways. The question, then, is: 'Which framework is the best one?' I would argue Darwinism has several fundamental problems that the advance of biology since Darwin has only made more acute.

"And that’s where The Talk comes in. It’s irresponsible to teach biology without evolution, and yet many students worry about reconciling their beliefs with evolutionary science. Just as many Americans don’t grasp the fact that evolution is not merely a “theory,” but the underpinning of all biological science, a substantial minority of my students are troubled to discover that their beliefs conflict with the course material."

Note that the proper context for discussing the relationship between science and theology or religious belief is not within the context of science, or a science classroom, but within the context of philosophy. Insofar as science and religion are related, either positively or negatively, philosophy - and, in particular, the philosophy of nature and metaphysics - must act as the bridge between them. This is Barash's first major mistake: he assumes that, if religion is to be rational at all, it must be assessed 'scientifically'. This same mistake has been made by many atheists in recent decades (e.g., Richard Dawkins, Stephen Hawking, Leonard Mlodinow, Jerry Coyne, Peter Atkins, Sam Harris), and only serves to show how philosophically uneducated many influential atheists are. It also goes to show that being a great scientist does not automatically translate to being a good philosopher, historian, theologian, sociologist, etc.

"Until recently, I had pretty much ignored such discomfort, assuming that it was their problem, not mine. Teaching biology without evolution would be like teaching chemistry without molecules, or physics without mass and energy. But instead of students’ growing more comfortable with the tension between evolution and religion over time, the opposite seems to have happened. Thus, The Talk.

There are a few ways to talk about evolution and religion, I begin. The least controversial is to suggest that they are in fact compatible. Stephen Jay Gould called them “nonoverlapping magisteria,” noma for short, with the former concerned with facts and the latter with values. He and I disagreed on this (in public and, at least once, rather loudly); he claimed I was aggressively forcing a painful and unnecessary choice, while I maintained that in his eagerness to be accommodating, he was misrepresenting both science and religion."

Barash is actually correct that Gould's NOMA, however well-intentioned, does misrepresent science and religion, and the relationship between them. Where Barash and Gould both go wrong is in ignoring the importance of philosophy to this discussion. NOMA fails to take seriously enough the real-world claims of religion (particularly theistic religion). Barash fails to realise that real-world claims can be made that have little to do with the physical and biological sciences. If you divide the world into the physical (science) and the emotional (Gould's 'religion'), then you fail to recognise that many of the most important real-world claims have little to do with either. Questions about the ultimate origins of the universe, or the order found in the universe, cannot be answered in terms of physical mechanisms, because appeal to physical mechanisms only makes sense if you first assume the existence of the universe and a fundamental order to the universe. Questions about right and wrong, about the direction that societies should should go, etc. cannot be answered using nothing but the empirical-mathematical methods of physics or biology. Yet, unless we can ground ethical and political debates in the real world it is impossible to avoid emotionalism in public debate. In other words, there must be a 'middle ground', a real sphere of knowledge - not just emotionalism - that is also not physical science. In this sense, science and theology cannot overlap, but both overlap with philosophy - at least in the sense that philosophy deals with real world issues relevant to both science and theology. Science, philosophy and theology do not offer different (competing) answers to the same questions. Instead, they answer different questions about the same reality.

"In some ways, Steve has been winning. Noma is the received wisdom in the scientific establishment, including institutions like the National Center for Science Education, which has done much heavy lifting when it comes to promoting public understanding and acceptance of evolution. According to this expansive view, God might well have used evolution by natural selection to produce his creation.

This is undeniable. If God exists, then he could have employed anything under the sun — or beyond it — to work his will. Hence, there is nothing in evolutionary biology that necessarily precludes religion, save for most religious fundamentalisms (everything that we know about biology and geology proclaims that the Earth was not made in a day)."

The NCSE is a political institution, and so will offer political - i.e., not intellectual - solutions to public issues. It is politically expedient to advocate NOMA, so the NCSE adovcates NOMA, for now. In truth, the NCSE was founded by secular humanists, and advances a secular humanist agenda. So the battle, here, between Barash, Dawkins, etc. and the NCSE is not a case of one group defending religion while the other critiques it. Rather it is an in-house debate about how best to win an intrinsically political battle against religion. Consequently, I have about as much sympathy for the ideology of the NCSE as I do for Barash's ideology: zero, nil, zilch, zip, nada. For the NCSE, it acceptable to say the God might have used evolution (in my opinion, an intellectually viable option, contrary to Barash's claims), so long as you don't have to accept that theism is intellectually defensible. To the NCSE, theism is a theoretical option only, not a real, intellectual one. The moment the theist attempts to argue for the existence of God, the NCSE will be on the side of Barash, not the theists.

"So far, so comforting for my students. But here’s the turn: These magisteria are not nearly as nonoverlapping as some of them might wish. As evolutionary science has progressed, the available space for religious faith has narrowed: It has demolished two previously potent pillars of religious faith and undermined belief in an omnipotent and omni-benevolent God."

We see here that Barash assumes a view of God as an alternative to scientific explanation. This is not, however, how most theists have understood God. Historically, for theists, God is not a scientific hypothesis, but a metaphysical necessity. It is not possible to have a complete, rational understanding of reality without God, so argues the greatest proofs of the existence of God, from Plato and Aristotle to Gottfried Leibniz and Samuel Clarke - and almost every major theist in between. The simple fact is that the most substantive case for God's existence has little or nothing to do with biological complexity. So, a Darwinian refutation of Paley's biological design argument, even if plausible, would not have any effect on the arguments of most major theist philosophers and theologians.

"The twofold demolition begins by defeating what modern creationists call the argument from complexity. This once seemed persuasive, best known from William Paley’s 19th-century claim that, just as the existence of a complex structure like a watch demands the existence of a watchmaker, the existence of complex organisms requires a supernatural creator. Since Darwin, however, we have come to understand that an entirely natural and undirected process, namely random variation plus natural selection, contains all that is needed to generate extraordinary levels of non-randomness. Living things are indeed wonderfully complex, but altogether within the range of a statistically powerful, entirely mechanical phenomenon."

 And so, in a paragraph, Barash dismisses any defence of the 'argument from complexity'. Actually, this is not true, since the arguments from fine-tuning in physics and the 'rare-earth' hypothesis in astronomy are equally appealing to religious apologists eager to defend the 'argument from complexity' today. Darwinism, a biological theory, can have nothing to say about these recent arguments, as they are pre-requisites for the existence of life.

But, really, how plausible does Barash expect his assertions here to be, considering that he conveniently fails to mention that Darwinism (or neo-Darwinism) has been criticized as severely today as it was when it was first advanced in 1859? 

"A few of my students shift uncomfortably in their seats. I go on. Next to go is the illusion of centrality. Before Darwin, one could believe that human beings were distinct from other life-forms, chips off the old divine block. No more. The most potent take-home message of evolution is the not-so-simple fact that, even though species are identifiable (just as individuals generally are), there is an underlying linkage among them — literally and phylogenetically, via traceable historical connectedness. Moreover, no literally supernatural trait has ever been found in Homo sapiens; we are perfectly good animals, natural as can be and indistinguishable from the rest of the living world at the level of structure as well as physiological mechanism."

In truth, the question of the existence of God is independent of the question of the uniqueness of human beings. Or, rather, it would be possible for God to exist even if there were no humanity at all, or if humanity were nothing more than animals. It is only if God exists that humanity might have some special significance, I think. So, this is not a 'pillar' of theism, but an implication of theism.

Nevertheless, Barash's argument is both question-begging and self-refuting. It is question-begging, because one would not expect to see 'supernatural' traits 'at the level of structure' in biological organisms - any more than would expect to find good or love lodged between neurons in the brain. By 'supernatural' Barash clearly means 'immaterial' or 'incorporeal'. But it is an obvious categorical error to suggest that, if the physical sciences - which, y'know study physical stuff - can't find anything immaterial in human persons, that means such things don't exist. That's about as logical as a blind man insisting that, because he can't see anything, colours aren't real features of the world. As far as arguments go, that one belongs in the 'dumb as...' pile.

It is self-refuting, because Barash must assume the unique importance of rational thought in order to make any argument against theism or the special uniqueness of humanity. But it is precisely because human beings are capable of such reasoning that they are unique among earth's animal population. To assert that there is no significant distinction between a human and a dog, is to conveniently ignore the fact that the dog could not make such arguments. It simply lacks the intellectual capacity to do so - and so do all other non-human animals. Similarly, to argue that humans have no more moral significance than a rat, a pig or a dog is to conveniently ignore the fact that dogs, pigs and rats are incapable of such moral reasoning. Furthermore, it is precisely the intellectual and moral aspects of the human person that are 'supernatural' in the sense that Barash uses the term - that is, they are, and must be, immaterial. These things cannot be reducible to purely material (Darwinian) mechanisms. Actually, this point has been made by atheist philosopher Thomas Nagel, in his book Mind and Cosmos - though Nagel would not use the term 'supernatural' to describe them. It is, also, the basis for, for example, Thomas Aquinas' argument for the immortality of the soul. Barash, and others like him, should be more familiar with the views of the great philosophers and theologians, if they expect to make any meaningful criticisms of religious belief.

"Adding to religion’s current intellectual instability is a third consequence of evolutionary insights: a powerful critique of theodicy, the scholarly effort to reconcile belief in an omnipresent, omni-benevolent God with the fact of unmerited suffering.

Theological answers range from claiming that suffering provides the option of free will to announcing (as in the Book of Job) that God is so great and we so insignificant that we have no right to ask. But just a smidgen of biological insight makes it clear that, although the natural world can be marvelous, it is also filled with ethical horrors: predation, parasitism, fratricide, infanticide, disease, pain, old age and death — and that suffering (like joy) is built into the nature of things. The more we know of evolution, the more unavoidable is the conclusion that living things, including human beings, are produced by a natural, totally amoral process, with no indication of a benevolent, controlling creator."

The problem of evil has been a significant issue in religious thought for thousands of years. Not surprisingly, the argument from evil against God is almost as old. Darwin didn't suddenly make us aware of the reality of parasitism, predation, fratricide, infanticide, disease, old age and death! (Actually, many of these things are described in the Bible, so religious theists have been very aware of them for millenia.) If the argument from evil is valid, then it was valid long before Darwin came along. If it is invalid, the addition of Darwinism into the mix doesn't help the argument. Note that this argument has nothing to do with science. This is an explicitly philosophical argument - though Barash doesn't seem to realise this fact. Nor does he realise that several of the most powerful responses to the 'argument from evil' by theistic philosophers have been fully developed since the 1850s, and that Darwinism does nothing to undermine them. (For detailed responses to this argument, see Alvin Plantinga's God, Freedom & Evil and Brian Davies' The Reality of God and the Problem of Evil.)

The most significant response to the argument from evil is to point out that the argument is self-refuting - as so many anti-theistic arguments seem to be. The basic problem is that, a purely materialistic worldview cannot provide a sound basis for morality. That is, concepts like 'good' and 'evil' are meaningless in a materialistic reality. As I have said above, if you can't ground morality in the real world, then debates over right and wrong necessarily degenerate into emotionalism. The alleged 'wrongness' of God's allowing suffering and evil in the world must assume a transcendent source of goodness - that is, a source of goodness that exists independently of material causes (which Barash himself notes are amoral)  and human opinion. Furthermore, 'goodness' implies moral obligation, and you cannot be obliged to an impersonal thing - like a 'force' or a 'law of nature' or a physical process. So, whatever is the source of goodness, must itself be perfect and must also both transcend material reality and be, in some sense, personal (i.e., an intellect). And this, as Aquinas might say, all call God. (For details, see here, here, here, and here.)

So, the argument from evil assumes the reality of evil - and thus, necessarily, the reality of good, for the concept of 'evil' is meaningless without the concept of 'good'. But, 'good', if it is not to be meaningless, must be grounded in God. So the argument implicitly (though, unintentionally) assumes the reality of God. Oops. So, Dr. Barash, your plan was to refute the existence of God, by citing the reality of evil? Not a good plan.

One final issue, perhaps the only intellectually serious point that Barash makes in this essay, is the last comment. So, is it reasonable to accept that God would create via a method in which suffering and death are essential to the process? In response, I would say three things:

Firstly, the proposed Darwinian mechanism of mutation + natural selection + time is not nearly as certain as Barash wishes his readers to believe (or even plausible, for that matter). One possible option for the theist is, then, to reject Darwinism. 

Secondly, as I noted above, this argument is merely an extension of the argument from evil - that is to say that the argument relies on the logic of the argument from evil. If that argument is flawed, then the extended argument is also flawed. The argument from evil is flawed, as I have shown. Therefore, Barash's extended argument is also flawed.

Thirdly, this does not mean the problem of evil goes away. The problem hasn't gone away in two and a half thousand years. My point is simply that this problem is not fatal to theism, for the reasons stated above. It is necessary to distinguish here between the problem of evil for theism and the argument from evil for atheism. They are not the same. The argument from evil can be shown to be deeply flawed without any definite resolution to the problem of evil being proposed. For my part, I am convinced the the argument form evil fails; I am less convinced by attempted resolutions to the problem of evil.

"I CONCLUDE The Talk by saying that, although they don’t have to discard their religion in order to inform themselves about biology (or even to pass my course), if they insist on retaining and respecting both, they will have to undertake some challenging mental gymnastic routines. And while I respect their beliefs, the entire point of The Talk is to make clear that, at least for this biologist, it is no longer acceptable for science to be the one doing those routines, as Professor Gould and noma have insisted we do."

 Although Barash talks about 'respect', he doesn't respect religious theism enough to understand it properly, or to even acknowledge the many and varied responses to his arguments. Too many atheists engage in a one-sided debate, repeating the same arguments over and over and over, apparently oblivious to the fact that their favourite arguments have been refuted many times. These days, many atheists like Barash talk about 'respect', but their idea of respect lacks any meaningful content. 'Respect', as I understand it, doesn't mean saying 'It's OK for you to have your silly ideas, I'm not going to stop you.' Respect is, instead, to realise that there are many intelligent people who hold views different from your own, and that this fact requires that you take the time to understand these different views if you are going to criticise them publicly.

 "Despite these three evolutionary strikes, God hasn’t necessarily struck out. At the end of the movie version of “Inherit the Wind,” based on the famous Scopes “monkey trial” over a Tennessee law prohibiting the teaching of evolution, Spencer Tracy’s character, fashioned after the defense attorney Clarence Darrow, stands in the empty courtroom, picks up a Bible in one hand and Darwin’s “Origin of Species” in the other, gives a knowing smile and claps them together before putting both under his arm. Would that it were so simple."

 Of course, it's not that simple. But neither is refuting theism as simple as Barash's 'three evolutionary strikes'. In fact, the only thing about this issue that is 'simple' is Barash's simple-minded attacks on theism, and others like them.

A historical point: Barash comments that 'Inherit the Wind' is 'based on' the Scopes Trial. Actually, the film, and the play it is based on, is a complete distortion of history. See Edward Larson's Summer for the Gods: The Scopes Trial and America's Continuing Debate Over Science and Religion for details.